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1 Introduction 
1.1 Connection in Marketing 
 Business environment nowadays are complex in nature in the sense that market 
participants are closely connected. For companies, they meet each other in different markets; 
and for consumers, they link themselves to each other in various online platforms. Such 
feature requires more research attention to explore the implication of the connection among 
market participant: what is its effect on company performances; how does it affect consumer 
behaviors; and how itself can be influence by business and technology innovations. 
Understanding these issues is crucial for business successes. This dissertation explores these 
issues through three distinct papers. Specifically, we examine the phenomenon of brands 
coexisting with their siblings and competitors in multiple product markets and the effect of 
such overlap on brand performances; we analyze the business strategy in the coupon practice 
of linking consumers to each other through coupon trading and investigate whether it leads to 
higher coupon redemption; and we measure the extent to which virtual currency impacts 
platform users’ individual behaviors and their interactions. 
 This dissertation highlights the importance of taking connection, dependency and 
influence among companies and those among consumers into consideration when doing 
research in marketing. It offers insights on evaluating and enhancing the performance of 
companies and the engagement of consumers through analyzing the effect, the application 
and the influential factor of such connection. The three independent papers in this dissertation 
are all empirical in nature. Using different statistical modeling strategies, they reveal the 
validity and usefulness of establishing connections among companies and that among 
consumers. Based on the empirical analyses, this dissertation delivers generalizable results 
and provides managerial implications to the existing marketing research and practices. 
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1.2 Overview of Studies in This Dissertation 
This dissertation contributes to existing research in several ways: In the first study, 
the connection among brands and companies is analyzed from the angle of multimarket 
contact. Against the background of the mass adoption of multi-brand multi-market overlap, 
this work is the first in the existing marketing research to empirically measure and compare 
the effect of multimarket contact among sibling brands and competing brands. In the second 
study, the connection among consumers is analyzed in the coupon industry from the angle of 
coupon trading. Against the background of the booming in digital coupons and online coupon 
platforms, this work empirically investigates the effect of coupon trading on coupon 
redemption for the first time in marketing research. In the third study, the connection among 
consumers is further examined from the angle of testing virtual currency’s effect on 
consumers’ interaction. Against the background of the popularity of virtual currency, this 
work is the first in the marketing research to bridge the literature on money and that on 
virtual currency. For the first time, whether virtual currency can act as an influential factor on 
consumers’ interaction in online environment is empirically investigated. A brief overview of 
the three studies constituting this dissertation is presented in Table 1.1. In the table, research 
questions, research contributions, research data and empirical methods are summarized. 
  
	 3 
Table 1.1 Overview of the thesis structure 
Study 1: Multimarket Contact with Sibling Brands 
Research questions 
Given imperfect 
observability, what is the 
competition deterrence 
effect of the multimarket 
contact with brands from 
the same company 
compared to the effect of 
the MMC with brands 
from different 
companies?  
 
Core contributions 
- Investigating not only the effect of 
MMC on competition behaviors 
among competing brands, but also 
among sibling brands. 
- Basing the analysis on the under-
researched product market. 
- Applying both pooled and fixed 
effects quantile regression to avoid 
artificial censoring and to take into 
consideration the brand 
heterogeneity. 
Data basis 
Monthly sales of 38 
major brands from 17 
automobile 
manufacturing 
companies in the U.S. 
market ranging from 
January 2009 to February 
2012; brand 
characteristics; brands’ 
multimarket contacts and 
market environment etc. 
Empirical methods: Pooled and fixed effects quantile regression 
Main results: 
- MMC with competing brands functions effectively as a defection deterrence mechanism. 
- There is no evidence indicates that MMC with sibling brands functions effectively as a 
defection deterrence mechanism. 
- Market level MMC does not seem to affect brands‘ competition behavior. 
 
Study 2: The Social Exposure Effect of Coupon Trading on Coupon Redemption 
Research questions 
Does coupon trading 
increase coupon 
redemption likelihood 
within the context of 
digital coupons and 
third-party coupon 
platforms due to the 
repeated exposure 
towards product related 
information generated 
among consumers 
themselves? 
  
Core contributions 
- Extending the existing coupon 
literature by examining the effect 
of coupon trading on coupon 
redemption likelihood through the 
social exposure generated among 
consumers themselves. 
- Analyzing the effect of coupon 
trading on coupon redemption 
behavior based on a dataset with 
comprehensive consumer behavior. 
- Applying a cross-classified discrete 
time event history approach to 
capture the complex data structure 
and to derive robust results. 
Data basis 
A longitudinal dataset 
ranging from January 
2012 to December 2012 
based on a Swiss online 
coupon service provider, 
with a sample size of 
2,224,838 observations, 
including 32,603 
consumers, 265 products, 
1,923,405 coupon trades 
and 7,773 coupon 
redemptions. 
Empirical methods: Cross-classified discrete time event history analysis 
Main results: 
- Coupon trading positively affects coupon redemption likelihood due to the repeated 
exposure towards product related information generated among consumers themselves. 
- Coupon trading positively affects coupon redemption likelihood even when the coupons are 
not actually received by consumers. 
- Rather than causing mental burden, there seems to be a positive spillover effect among 
trading activities on different products. 
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Study 3: Two Sides of the Same Coin: The Effect of Virtual Currency on User Behavior 
Research questions 
What is the effect of 
virtual currency on 
online platform users’ 
behaviors? Does it 
properly function as an 
incentivizing power? Is 
there any potentially 
negative effect of virtual 
currency? 
Core contributions 
- Extending the existing virtual 
currency literature by empirically 
measure the effect of virtual 
currency on online platform users’ 
behaviors. 
- Bridging research on money and 
that on virtual currency by 
extending the findings on money 
psychology to the context of virtual 
currency. 
- Taking on a more balanced view of 
the effect of virtual currency by 
investigating its positive as well as 
negative effect. 
Data basis 
Comprehensive user 
behavior data collected 
from a Swiss online 
platform over a time 
period of 47 weeks based 
on 16,962 platform users, 
1,315,899 total logins, 
711,256 trade proposals 
and 35,227 product 
redemptions. 
Empirical methods: Fixed effects Poisson regression 
Main results: 
- Virtual currency, as an incentivizing force and as an instrument of payment, facilitates 
platform users in attaining their personal goal of product redemption. 
- The demand for virtual currency drives users to log onto the platform significantly more 
often. 
- Virtual currency decreases interaction among users. 
 
1.2.1 Summary of Study One (Chapter 2) 
In the first study, we attempt to compare the effect of multimarket contact with sibling 
brands and the effect of multimarket contact with competing brands, given imperfect 
observability. Multimarket contact (MMC) is broadly defined as a situation in which firms 
exist simultaneously with rivals in more than one market (Karnani & Wernerfelt, 1985). In 
the modern business environment, companies are commonly inter-connected in the sense that 
they meet each other in different product markets. It has long been argued that the outcome of 
such MMC is lower rivalry intensity among firms, a phenomenon known as mutual 
forbearance (Bernheim & Whinston, 1990; Edwards, 1955; Scott, 1991). This is because that 
with the existence of MMC, aggressive and competitive moves by a focal firm in one market 
can lead to retaliation from rivals in other markets in which the firms coexist. The term 
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“sibling brands” is used to describe brands from the same company and “competing brands” 
for brands from different companies. Nowadays, companies often have multiple brands 
coexisting simultaneously in multiple markets. Whether there is a significant difference 
between the effect of MMC with sibling brands and that of MMC with competing brands can 
have a profound influence on the behavior of a focal brand, which affects the performance of 
the companies in turn. Imperfect observability indicates that competition moves may not 
always be perfectly observed. The rapidly changing business environment and the non-price 
competition in oligopolistic industries renders the full observability assumption implausible. 
 We analyze brand-level panel data from the U.S. automobile industry over 37 months 
using quantile regression. Our results suggest that while MMC with competing brands works 
effectively as a defection-deterrence mechanism. However, no evidence indicates that brands 
respond to MMC with siblings. This indicates that companies with multi-brand, multi-market 
overlap will not be at a competitive disadvantage compared to groups that do not adopt this 
strategy, hence validating such business practices. This study extends existing MMC 
literature and bridges MMC with brand strategy, offering important implications for 
researchers and practitioners.  
1.2.2 Summary of Study Two (Chapter 3) 
In the second study, we examine the social exposure effect of coupon trading on 
coupon redemption. Accompanying the surge in digital coupons, a handful number of online 
third-party coupon service providers have emerged due to the lucrative business opportunities 
and revenue gains (Kumar & Rajan, 2012). Coupon service providers heavily rely on coupon 
redemptions to generate revenues, to build up reputation, and to draw external investment. 
Thus, exploring ways to increase coupon redemption rate is very important for coupon 
service providers. With coupon trading, consumers are repeatedly exposed to product related 
information whenever other consumers suggest them for a trade. Different from FSI (Free 
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Standing Insert) or retailer customized coupons, where coupon manufacturers and coupon 
retailers are the source of influence, coupon trading affects coupon redemption due to the 
social exposure effect induced among consumers themselves. In this study, we measure the 
effect of coupon trading on coupon redemption likelihood through such social exposure. 
The empirical analysis is built on a longitudinal dataset collected from a Swiss online 
coupon service provider. The data contains consumer and product information ranging from 
January 2012 to December 2012 for one full year and records 1,923,405 coupon trades, 
32,603 consumers, 265 products and a total number of 7,773 redemptions. To capture 
temporal dependency, consumer heterogeneity and product heterogeneity, a cross-classified 
discrete time event history analysis is estimated by MCMC (Monte Carlo Markov Chain). 
Our results suggest that coupon trading can increase coupon redemption likelihood due to the 
consumer-induced exposure towards product related information. This implies that the 
positive effect of coupon trading leads to a higher propensity and shorter time period for 
coupon platforms to collect revenues, ceteris paribus. Our work provides important 
implications to both the academia and the industry. 
1.2.3 Summary of Study Three (Chapter 4) 
In the third study, we measure the effect of virtual currency on platform users’ 
behaviors. To retain and motivate platform users, many practitioners are following the trend 
of introducing virtual currency on their platforms (Castronova, 2014). However, the 
underlying reasoning for such practice has mainly vaguely rooted in the traditional economic 
sense that virtual currency, due to its similarity to money in terms of the instrumentality, 
would make the market of exchange more liquid. Our results show that without fully 
understanding the effect of virtual currency, the implementation can lead to unsatisfactory 
result. 
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Research on money and money psychology has produced prolific results and has 
greatly advanced our understanding of the effect of money on people’s behavior. Though 
gaining considerable popularity, virtual currency has received limited research attention 
compared to money. By empirically investigating both the positive effect and negative effect 
of virtual currency on platform users’ behaviors, our work addresses the gaps in both the 
academia and the industry.   
This study collects data from a Swiss online social gaming and shopping platform. 
The longitudinal data includes 16,962 platform users from late January 2013 to late 
December 2013 over a total length of 47 weeks. Using fixed effects Poisson regression, we 
find that virtual currency can indeed exert significant influence on platform users’ behaviors. 
Specifically, our results suggest that (1) virtual currency facilitates platform users in attaining 
their personal goals as an incentivizing force and as an instrument of payment; (2) the 
demand for virtual currency retains platform users on the platform; (3) virtual currency 
undermines user interaction on average. The finding on the effect of virtual currency echoes 
previous research on money and testifies that, same as money, virtual currency incentivizes 
users, but only in terms of individualism. The results in this paper offer important 
implications and guidelines to the application of virtual currency 
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2 Multimarket Contact with Sibling Brands 
 
Abstract 
Multimarket contact (MMC) plays an important role in modern business. Although 
MMC is an active research topic, studies have overlooked the dynamics among multimarket 
sibling brands. In this paper, we test the competition-deterrence effect of MMC with sibling 
brands and with competing brands. Unlike most of the existing literature, which has assumed 
full observability, we base our analysis within the framework of imperfect observability. We 
analyze brand-level panel data from the U.S. automobile industry over 37 months. Our results 
suggest that while MMC with competing brands works effectively as a defection-deterrence 
mechanism, no evidence indicates that brands respond to MMC with siblings. This study 
extends existing MMC literature and bridges MMC with brand strategy, offering important 
implications for researchers and practitioners. 
 
Keywords: multimarket contact, imperfect observability, multi-brand strategy, multi-market 
strategy, quantile regression   
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2.1 Introduction 
In the modern business environment, companies commonly operate in different 
product markets, which drive the emergence of multimarket contact (MMC). MMC is 
broadly defined as a situation in which firms exist simultaneously with rivals in more than 
one market (Karnani & Wernerfelt, 1985). With the existence of MMC, aggressive and 
competitive moves by a focal firm in one market can lead to retaliation from rivals in other 
markets in which the firms coexist. It has long been argued that the outcome of MMC is 
lower rivalry intensity among firms, a phenomenon known as mutual forbearance (Bernheim 
& Whinston, 1990; Edwards, 1955; Scott, 1991).  
While considerable research has focused on the topic of MMC, two issues require 
additional research attention. First, MMC models usually assume full observability, where 
defections from equilibrium (violations of mutual forbearance) can always be detected and 
punished (Yu & Cannella, 2013). However, competition moves may not always be perfectly 
observed. This partial observability may be the result of the currently rapidly changing 
business environment in the sense that competitive actions have extended well beyond the 
domain of prices. It is difficult for competitors to perfectly monitor non-price competition 
moves, such as services. In many oligopolistic industries, such as the automobile industry, 
non-price competition is the major source of rivalry due to the fear of price wars (Rios, 
McConnell, & Brue, 2013). Compared to price competition, non-price competition is difficult 
to evaluate; hence, full observability is rendered implausible.  
Second, companies often have multiple brands (referred to as sibling brands in this 
paper, in contrast with competing brands, which are brands from different companies) 
coexisting simultaneously in multiple markets. Whether there is a significant difference 
between the effect of MMC with sibling brands and that of MMC with competing brands can 
have a profound influence on the behavior of a focal brand, which affects the performance of 
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the companies in turn. Thus, investigating the effect of MMC at the brand level is of both 
theoretic and practical importance, especially for firms that simultaneously offer products 
under several brands in various markets. Studies based on aggregated firm levels 
automatically assume multi-brand companies as unitary market participants and ignore 
competition at the brand level. Although this approach is frequently adopted, such an analysis 
is less than ideal in the modern business environment. 
Therefore, the two above-mentioned issues are of crucial importance to both 
academia and the industry. For this reason, we attempt to answer the following research 
question: given imperfect observability, what is the effect of the MMC of several brands from 
the same company compared to the effect of the MMC with brands from different companies? 
By answering this research question, we are able to extend existing MMC studies and 
contribute to this stream of literature by addressing the earlier-mentioned research gaps. We 
use the term “sibling brands” to describe brands from the same company and “competing 
brands” for brands from different companies. Similar to previous studies, the authors do not 
assume perfect observability (Greve, 2008).  
In this study, the empirical models are based on the automobile industry during the 
most recent crisis in North America. This specific time window is interesting to study 
because the whole industry is under pressure, which offers a new context in which to study 
MMC and competition. Good knowledge on brand performance under MMC can thus help 
brands and companies or manufacturing groups lay a solid foundation for future prosperity1. 
We investigate the effect of MMC on brand performance in product markets by applying the 
quantile regression method. It has long been argued that MMC can decrease market share 
instability (Heggestad & Rhoades, 1978). Hence, the variation in sales growth conditional on 
MMC is expected to be heterogeneous across the distribution of sales growth. Due to the 																																																								
1 In the automobile industry, multi-brand companies are often referred to as manufacturing groups. Thus, 
companies and manufacturing groups are used interchangeably in the rest of this paper. 
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potential unequal variance in sales growth, we argue that quantile regression is the more 
appropriate and robust method with which to study our research question and derive 
inferences from the empirical model. It enables us to obtain results across different segments 
of sales growth while being robust to outliers.  
In this paper, we show several important results. First, the results derived in this paper 
suggest that only the MMC with competing brands effectively serves as a defection-
deterrence mechanism in the sense that it lowers the competition level and induces mutual 
forbearance. We do not find evidence that MMC with siblings facilitates mutual forbearance 
and competition deterrence. Second, our findings provide important managerial implications 
in the sense that the multi-brand, multi-market overlap business strategy is validated because 
MMC with siblings does not lead to a brand competing less intensively than brands without 
MMC with siblings. Therefore, companies or manufacturing groups with multi-brand, multi-
market overlap will not be at a competitive disadvantage compared to groups that do not 
adopt this strategy. Specifically, for a manufacturing group that does not have multi-brand, 
multi-market overlap, as the MMC of its brands increases, the group competes less 
intensively in general; for a manufacturing group that adopts multi-brand, multi-market 
overlap by extending brands in multiple markets, the rules of the game change in such a sense 
that an increase in the overall MMC of its brands does not necessarily lower the group’s 
competitive intensity because MMC with siblings does not deter competition. Groups that 
employ this strategy do not need to worry about losing competitive ground to competitors 
due to the additional mutual forbearance resulting from MMC among sibling brands.  
 
2.2 Related Literature and Theoretical Framework 
MMC has been studied across various industries, such as the airline industry  
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(Gimeno & Woo, 1999; Korn & Baum, 1999; Prince & Simon, 2009), financial industry 
(Greve, 2006; Hannan & Prager, 2009; Shipilov, 2009), health care industry (Shankar, 1999; 
Stephan et al., 2003), and PC-related industries (Kang, Bayus, & Balasubramanian, 2010; 
Young et al., 2000). Nevertheless, as one of the largest industries in the world, the 
automobile industry has not received much research attention regarding the topic of MMC. 
To the best of our knowledge, very limited research has been conducted in the automobile 
industry (Leheyda, 2008; Yu & Cannella, 2007). This paper enriches the diversification of 
the existing MMC literature by conducting empirical analyses on brands under single- and 
multi-brand automobile manufacturing groups.  
MMC occurs when firms meet their competitors in multiple markets. With such 
frequent encounters, firms mutually recognize that their decisions are interdependent, which 
leads to lower competition intensity, a term known as “mutual forbearance”. The motivating 
logic is that firms are aware of the fact that their competitive moves in one market may 
provoke retaliation in all markets in which they coexist with their rivals (Evans & Kessides, 
1994; Haveman & Nonnemaker, 2000; Heggestad & Rhoades, 1978). This means that when 
defection is always detected and punished, more MMC leads to more severe retaliation from 
rivals, who can respond to the defection in more markets. Therefore, under full observability, 
high MMC lowers competition intensity because it implies greater punishment strength 
(Bernheim & Whinston, 1990). 
Most of the existing MMC literature assumes perfect monitoring in which any 
deviation from the collusive equilibrium is always detected and punished. However, given 
modern business practices, it is very difficult to perfectly monitor all competitors’ moves. 
Difficulty and costliness prevent the perfect observation of frequent price changes, especially 
in shorter time windows (e.g., monthly). Moreover, business practices such as non-price 
competition through services are not easy to evaluate, and these moves, with a stealthy nature 
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and an ambiguous interpretation, pose great difficulty to full observation and are less likely to 
draw a response (Chen & Hambrick, 1995). This is especially true for oligopolistic markets 
such as the automobile industry because non-price competition is a major source of rivalry in 
such markets. While the existing literature on MMC relies mainly on the full observability 
assumption, imperfect monitoring requires additional research efforts because it is based on a 
different mechanism, namely, whether defection is detected. This mechanism contradicts the 
mechanism of mutual forbearance under full observability, which is based instead on whether 
sufficient punishments exist to deter defection. Full observability has been theoretically 
challenged as a necessary prerequisite to sustain mutual forbearance (Matsushima, 2001). 
However, empirical analyses of MMC under imperfect observability are scarce. Imperfect 
observability renders price analysis infeasible. By relying on sales growth instead of price to 
explore the effect of MMC, Greve (2008) showed that mutual forbearance could be sustained, 
even without full observability, and extended Matsushima’s theoretical two-player repeated 
games model into an empirical model with multiple non-identical firms. Due to imperfect 
observability, firms cannot fully monitor competitors’ moves. Rather, they can only 
imperfectly monitor competitors through the realization of some noisy signal (e.g., sales 
growth). Because the market is noisy (e.g., random sales growth variation due to some 
demand shocks), the signal is triggered in defection markets with positive probability !"<1 
and in non-defection markets with positive probability !#<!". 
 Firms can individually detect defection if the number of markets in which the signal 
is observed reaches some threshold $ set by the firms. Therefore, as firms overlap with each 
other more, the likelihood they will observe the signal increases (i.e., the likelihood that the 
threshold r will be reached increases), meaning a higher probability to detect defection. 
Moreover, firms can also learn that someone has defected by observing other players 
initiating punishments after discovering the defection. This notion is illustrated in Figure 2.1.  
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Market 
   Firm 1 2 3 4 5 
A 
     B 
     C 
     D 
     E 
     F 
     G 
     H 
     I 
     J 
     K 
     L 
     M 
     N 
     
      Multimarket Contact 
     Firm A 4 3 4 0 3 
Market Level 5/8 4/5 5/6 0/2 4/4 
Figure 2.1 Firm-level MMC and market-level MMC 
Firms A and B coexist in two markets (markets 1 and 3). If firm A defects in three out 
of the five markets in which it operates (e.g., in markets 2, 3 and 4), the probability that its 
defection is detected will be higher if another firm C has MMC with firm A (e.g., in markets 
1 and 2). The reason for this result is, first, that firm B and C cover more markets in which 
the defection signal can be potentially observed, increasing the overall probability that A’s 
defection is detected. Second, once B or C is sure of the defection and begins to retaliate, for 
example, in market 1, the other company (B or C) can also learn that A has defected. 
Therefore, an increase in MMC enhances the probability that the defection is discovered. 
Even if the individual probability of detecting the defection is low, the joint probability can 
be sufficiently high when the defecting player has higher MMC. Therefore, Greve (2008) 
argued that as the amount of MMC a focal firm has increases, the probability that its 
defection will be detected increases, which, in turn, precipitates the firm to be reluctant to 
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defect out of fear of being discovered. In line with previous research, we expect that MMC 
among competing brands lowers their incentive to defect: 
H1: As a brand’s MMC with competing brands in a focal market increases, its sales 
growth in this market decreases. 
Extending the above argument further, as firms have fewer incentives to defect if they 
have MMC, given the same total number of players in the market, the market in which higher 
numbers of firms have MMC shall ensure a higher overall tacit collusion level. A higher 
collusion level means that the likelihood of undercutting other players is abundant. 
Consequently, it is lucrative for a player to defect in such a market. However, the argument in 
this study is slightly different from the argument in previous literature. While Greve (2008) 
stated that the sheer number of firms with MMC increases the potential collusion level, we 
argue that a ratio measure is more appropriate. Even with a high number of firms with MMC, 
a market can still have a lower collusion level if it is large enough to also embrace a non-
negligible number of firms that have only single market contacts. Firms without MMC are 
not subjected to the competition deterrence that results from MMC. Their existence may 
increase the overall competition level, and their counterparties may be unwilling to raise the 
collusion level out of fear of being undercut. As a result, the potential gain from defection 
can be low in such markets because the collusion level, if it exists, may be low enough to 
resemble a competitive market. As illustrated in Figure 2.1, for Firm A, market 1 has higher 
number of firms with MMC than market 5. However, market 5 remains a more promising 
place for defection, as all the firms have MMC, which indicates a higher potential collusion 
level, and Firm A has fewer MMCs in that market. Thus, we hypothesize the following: 
H2: As the market level of MMC increases, the brand’s sales growth in the same 
market increases. 
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 In this study, we also extend previous work by testing both the effect of MMC with 
sibling brands and the effect of MMC with competing brands. Although several studies have 
taken subsidiary-level factors into consideration, MMC with siblings was not modeled 
explicitly (Greve & Baum, 2001; Sengul & Gimeno, 2013; Yu et al., 2009) due to data 
availability constraints. However, as we introduced previously, the widely adopted multi-
brand strategy requires research effort to broaden the understanding of MMC and to expand 
our knowledge by taking into consideration the MMCs of sibling brands, as they can affect 
the brand-level and the company/manufacturing group-level performance. When brands’ total 
MMC considers that of siblings, brands’ response to the total MMC might differ from their 
response when the MMC does not involve siblings. MMC with siblings changes brands’ 
response by offering different motives and incentives than MMC with competing brands, 
which we will explain in detail in the following paragraphs. The automobile industry 
provides a well-fitting context for the focus of this research, as a handful of automobile 
manufacturing groups operate multiple brands that overlap in multiple product markets.  
Understanding the potential difference brands’ behaviors when facing MMC with 
siblings and MMC with competing brands can offer important managerial implications for 
manufacturing groups. In order to study the effect of MMC with sibling brands, we must first 
recognize its differences from the MMC with competing brands, especially for multi-brand 
groups. While mutual forbearance among competitors can lower competition intensity and 
raise profit levels, it can also lead to inefficient relationships and erode competitive edge in 
the long run (Greve, 2008; Yu & Cannella, 2013). Therefore, it is critical for companies or 
manufacturing groups to consider their intra-group competition relationship. Groups may 
prefer or even induce intra-group competition to fend off competitors because it fosters 
efficiency and competitive edge (Fauli-Oller & Giralt, 1995; Phelps & Fuller, 2000). 
Moreover, groups may want to avoid coalitions among sibling brands that are not in the best 
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interest of the group (Palmer, Jennings, & Zhou, 1993). Mutual forbearance resulting from 
MMC among sibling brands can breed inefficiency in competition and form coalitions with 
inertia to strive for better performance. However, it is evident that groups will tolerate or 
induce intra-group competition only up to the point that the group benefits from the 
competition.  
Now, let us consider brands from a multi-brand group. If these brands initiate mutual 
forbearance in the market strictly based on the total detection probability, they would have to 
give up more sales growth opportunities at the same level of MMC with competing brands 
than brands without siblings because the additional MMC with sibling brands increases 
detection probability. From brands’ point of view, this scenario is definitely not optimal. 
Obviously, competition is inevitable because sibling brands all have to fight for limited group 
resources and internal and external customers (Luo, 2005; Schmid & Schurig, 2003). Better-
performing brands will be favored when allocating group resources. Consequently, brands 
with siblings will experience more intra-group rivalry pressure than brands without siblings, 
due to resource allocation or group-induced rivalry. Foregoing sales growth opportunities can 
put them at a disadvantage in intra-group competition. Moreover, managers may be less 
worried about being detected by siblings than about being caught by competing brands 
because, even if the defection is detected by siblings and results in full competition (because 
other brands can join the punishment if they observe retaliation), the resulting full 
competition will not lead to any benefits in the group, which the group surely does not want. 
The managers of the defecting brands can easily “pass the buck” to their peers from brands 
that initiated the retaliation from a total group loss point of view. Taking this reality into 
consideration, the siblings would not be as willing as competing brands to initiate retaliation 
upon detecting the defection. Therefore, it is natural to suspect that, as a mechanism to deter 
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defection, the MMC with sibling brands will not work as effectively as MMC with competing 
brands. We therefore hypothesize the following: 
H3: The effect of MMC with sibling brands on defection deterrence is not as effective 
as that of MMC with competing brands. 
To the best of our knowledge, the authors are unaware of any previous research that 
specifically addresses this gap in the existing MMC literature. Kalnins’s work (2004) is 
related to this topic, but with a different research focus. This obvious inadequacy has recently 
been noted and has led to a call for additional studies on within-firm MMC (Yu & Cannella, 
2013).  
In this paper, the authors focus on product markets rather than geographical markets. 
The unbalanced number of MMC studies using geographical markets and product markets 
calls for more attention to the latter setup (Greve, 2008). Because brands are nested in 
manufacturing groups, the results of a brand-level model based on product markets can be 
naturally extended to infer the performance at the group level and to facilitate interpretation. 
We provide a detailed discussion of this issue in the implication section.  
 
2.3 Data and Methodology 
To study MMC and rivalry among sibling brands, we focus on a single, major 
industry – the U.S. automobile industry. The automobile industry was chosen because the 
topic of this study is inherent in this particular industry and because of the industry’s 
importance: it accounts for five percent of the U.S. GDP (Ramey & Vine, 2006). In the 
industry, automobile giants, commonly known as manufacturing groups, compose a 
significant portion (almost 95%) of the industry sales. Automobile groups usually operate a 
portfolio of brands, which can also overlap across different product markets. A major reason 
to follow this multi-brand strategy is that it offers automobile groups an effective way to 
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segment the current highly competitive and diverse market in order to inhibit competitors 
from gaining a market share (Mason & Milne, 1994). Specifically, we construct a dataset of 
38 major brands from 17 manufacturing groups, of which 34 brands were operated by 11 
multi-brand automobile groups, between January 2009 and February 2012, for a sample of 
4,829 observations after excluding the first observation period due to the lagged MMC 
measures. The list of brands and groups in this study is presented in Table 2.1. In Table 2.2, 
we show the summary statistics and correlation among covariates.  
To capture the defection, we use the sales growth deviation (SalesDev) as the 
dependent variable in our empirical analysis. Following previous literature, we define sales 
growth deviation as the difference between the focal brand’s sales growth and the median of 
all brands’ growth in that market (Greve, 2008). Theoretically, if all players engage in mutual 
forbearance, they will all have homogenous sales growth, as no player attempts to grab shares 
from others. If some players defect, the defecting players will have higher sales growth, 
which positively deviates from the market median. The cooperating players, on the other 
hand, will not deviate from the market median. However, in reality, random variation in sales 
is inevitable. As a result, stochastic deviation from the market median can occur even if the 
focal brand does not defect. Nevertheless, the stochastic variation will not induce sales 
growth to deviate considerably from the market median. Only defection would lead to larger 
positive sales growth deviation, which will lead to evident skewness in the dependent 
variable, as large deviations are most likely to be positive (i.e., defection) and small 
deviations are close to 0 (i.e., stochastic variation). Our data also exhibit this feature with 
positive skewness and a large amount of small deviations clustered around 0. Thus, our data 
fit the theory and are appropriate for the intended statistical tests.  
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Table 2.1 List of automobile brands and groups 
Company/Manufacturing Group Brand 
BMW 
BMW 
MINI 
FCA 
CHRYSLER 
DODGE 
FIAT 
JEEP 
RAM 
DAIMLER 
MERCEDES-BENZ 
SMART 
FORD 
FORD 
LINCOLN 
MERCURY 
VOLVO (End in 2010) 
GENERAL MOTORS 
BUICK 
CADILLAC 
CHEVROLET 
GMC 
PONTIAC 
SAAB (End in 2010) 
SATURN 
HONDA ACURA 
HONDA 
HYUNDAI HYUNDAI 
KIA 
MAZDA MAZDA 
MITSUBISHI MITSUBISHI 
NISSAN 
INFINITI 
NISSAN 
SAAB SAAB (Since 2010) 
SUBARU SUBARU 
SUZUKI SUZUKI 
TATA 
JAGUAR 
LAND ROVER 
TOYOTA 
LEXUS 
SCION 
TOYOTA 
VOLKSWAGEN 
AUDI 
PORSCHE 
VOLKSWAGEN 
VOLVO VOLVO (Since 2010) 
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Table 2: Summary statistics and correlation table 
Variable Mean SD SalesDev MarketGrowth Single HHI Foreign MarketShare SibMMC CompMMC 
SalesDev 0.04399 0.381756 
 
              
MarketGrowth 0.03434 0.197356 0.0032 
 
            
Single 0.04017 0.196387 0.0005 0.0016 
 
          
HHI 0.13337 0.067063 -0.0041 -0.0059 -0.0720 
 
        
Foreign 11.07227 4.995063 -0.0264 0.0024 0.0528 -0.8231 
 
      
MarketShare 0.06882 0.081454 -0.0814 -0.0082 -0.1094 0.4111 -0.3552 
 
    
SibMMC 0.73017 0.877951 -0.0104 0.0084 -0.1702 -0.1632 0.1785 -0.0887 
 
  
CompMMC 12.66101 5.496743 -0.0169 0.0020 -0.4701 -0.6166 0.6871 -0.1783 0.2422 
 MarketMMC 0.95950 0.061480 0.0134 -0.0084 -0.3086 0.2327 -0.1717 0.0719 0.1073 0.1832 
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Both industry reports and academic papers reach the consensus that automobile 
product segments constitute distinct markets (Leheyda, 2008; Requena-Silvente & Walker, 
2005). Following Requena-Silvente and Walker (2005) and Leheyda (2008), we define 
markets based on the following product segments: small cars, mid-sized cars, large cars, 
luxury cars, sports cars, cross utility vehicles, sport utility vehicles, vans and pickups. This 
classification of the product market is also largely coherent with the practice of industrial 
organizations, such as the National Automobile Dealers Association (NADA). The dependent 
variable is derived based on monthly car sales data provided by Wards Automobile. 
To test mutual forbearance, we include three MMC measures in our model:  
- SibMMC: this measure accounts for the MMC that a brand has with its sibling brands, 
operationalized as the number of siblings in that market that have MMC with the 
focal brand.  
- CompMMC: this measure accounts for the MMC that a brand has with its competing 
brands, operationalized as the number of competing brands in that market that have 
MMC with the focal brand.  
- MarketMMC: this measure accounts for the potential gain if a focal player defects, 
operationalized as the ratio of the number of brands with at least one MMC in the 
market to the total number of brands in the market.  
As a simple example, suppose brands A, D and E are from the same manufacturing group. In 
Figure 2.1, brand A has 4 MMCs in market 1 because brands B, C, D and E all coexist with 
brand A in markets other than market 1. Brands D and E are sibling brands of brand A; thus, 
brand A’s SibMMC is 2. Brands B and C are competing brands of brand A; thus, brand A’s 
CompMMC is 2. Among all eight brands in market 1, five have at least one MMC (i.e., 
brands A, B, C, D and E); thus, the market level MarketMMC is 5/8.  
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The coefficient and significance of SibMMC enables us to examine the effect of 
MMC with sibling brands on defection deterrence. Compared to the coefficient and 
significance of CompMMC, the results can show whether the SibMMC is more or less 
effective. For two reasons, we use a ratio measure for market-level MMC instead of a simple 
count for two reasons. First, as we already explained in the earlier section, the room left for a 
player to undercut fellow market participants depends on both the number of brands with 
MMC and the number without MMC. Thus, a ratio measure better captures the potential level 
of collusion in the market. Second, the ratio measure is used to reduce multicollinearity. All 
three measures are count based. Though a number of different operationalizations of MMC 
have been introduced in previous studies, we argue that in our context, count-based measures 
best fit our research setting. When competitive moves are not perfectly observed, the high 
probability of being discovered, i.e., the sufficiently large number of other brands with MMC 
with the focal brand, prevents the brand from defecting, as we explained previously.  
In line with prior research, we use several additional variables to control market 
characteristics in our model. It is easier to coordinate behaviors in more concentrated markets. 
Thus, the Herfindahl Index (HHI) is introduced to separate the effect of MMC from market 
concentration, which serves as an alternative explanation of the uniform market behaviors of 
brands. Market participants are more tempted to plunder additional shares in growing markets. 
Foreign automakers have been argued to have superior cost structures than the domestic 
automakers. The competition level in the market can be higher with an increase in the 
number of foreign players. Thus, market growth (MarketGrowth) and numbers of foreign 
brands (Foreign) in the market are both included in the model. Smaller brands have lower 
stakes in maintaining tacit collusion. Single-market brands are arguably not subject to the 
competition deterrence mechanism of MMC. Hence, in the model, we also include market 
shares (MarketShare) and an indicator of whether a brand operates only in a single market 
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(Single) as brand-level control variables. Time fixed effects are modeled by including time 
dummies. The amount of monthly dummies would consume considerable degrees of freedom. 
Moreover, the month-by-month variation in time fixed effects is largely insignificant. Thus, 
we group the time fixed effects and estimate the models with quarterly dummies. 
Following the logic that we presented in the last section, large positive sales growth 
deviation from the market median is a clear sign of defection, while small positive/negative 
deviation from the median can be simply stochastic variation. This logic indicates the need 
for a modeling strategy that can separate positive and negative deviation (because negative 
deviation is stochastic variation) and capture the non-central location of the dependent 
variable’s conditional distribution (because only large positive deviation is a clear sign of 
defection). The previous literature has suggested artificially censoring sales growth deviation 
at 0 and using the Tobit estimator (Greve, 2008). However, censoring can be very costly 
because heteroscedasticity and non-normality can result in non-robustness and inconsistency 
in the Tobit estimator (Wooldridge, 2010). Heavy-tailed distribution is not uncommon in 
social phenomena and is surely the case for sales growth deviation. Therefore, we use 
quantile regression as the modeling methodology. Since the seminal work of Koenker and 
Bassett, the knowledge on quantile regression has been growing at a steady pace  
(Koenker, 2005; Koenker & Bassett, 1978). Using quantile regression does not require left-
censoring the data and thus does not induce additional assumptions. Because quantiles q >= 
0.5 correspond to the median and positive deviation from the median, we can effectively 
avoid artificially censoring the data by using quantile regression on quantiles q >= 0.5.  
Moreover, our research interest lies more in the non-central location of the dependent 
variable’s conditional distribution (i.e., larger positive deviation from the market median). 
Traditionally, researchers have extensively used models within the conditional mean 
framework. Nevertheless, conditional mean modeling has several inherent  
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limitations (Hao & Naiman, 2007). While focusing on the central location, conditional mean 
models cannot reveal the effect of outcomes and covariates at non-central locations, and 
important distributional properties are ignored. In our case, however, the upper half of the 
sales growth deviation (positive deviation from the market median) is exactly where our 
interest lies (because the sales growth deviation is operationalized as the difference from the 
median). More specifically, the larger positive deviation at the tail of its distribution (i.e., the 
higher percentiles of sales growth) is even more valuable, as it is a clear sign of defection 
rather than small positive deviation attributable to stochastic variation. We therefore use 
quantile regression instead of a Tobit model in this study because it can appropriately capture 
the phenomenon of interest (i.e., the larger positive deviation of sales growth). Moreover, 
unlike conditional mean models, quantile regression is robust to outliers. 
Another non-trivial issue with Tobit models relates to their inherent features. A Tobit 
model for positive sales growth deviation is based on both the probability that the deviation is 
positive and the conditional expected value of the positive deviation. More crucially, a Tobit 
model implicitly assumes that the process generating this information is the same, meaning 
that it is impossible to have cases with a lower probability of positive sales growth deviation 
but a larger magnitude of deviation when positive deviation occurs. Thus, a Tobit model can 
be restrictive and should be used with caution (Lin & Schmidt, 1984). Given all the above 
reasons, quantile regression with bootstrapped standard errors is a more robust modeling 
strategy in this case. 
 As a pre-analysis check on the variance components, we investigate a potential 
multilevel structure of the null model (Rabe-Hesketh & Skrondal, 2008). In Table 2.3, we 
compare the variance components of different specifications. None of the test statistics 
indicates the superiority of a multilevel model over pooling.  
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Table 2.2 Variance component analysis 
  Compare to pooling 
Observations nested in brands (Prob > chi2) = 1 
Observations nested in markets (Prob > chi2) = 0.153 
Observation nested in groups (Prob > chi2) = 1 
Cross-classified between brands and markets (Prob > chi2) = 0.5915 
 
Thus, our baseline model for the pth quantile is the following:2 
!"#$%&$'()) = ,-()) + ,/())0"12$341563ℎ + ,8())99: + ,;())<51$=>? + ,@())!=?>#$ + ,A())0"12$3!ℎ"1$
+ ,B())!=C00D + ,E())D5FG00D + ,H())0"12$300D + ,I())J=F$&KFFL8-IMN + O()) 
In addition to the baseline model, we run a quantile regression model with brand fixed 
effects to control for unobserved brand heterogeneity. The use of a fixed effects model 
introduces a dilemma in our study. On one hand, pooling can dampen the credibility of the 
model with potential omitted variable bias and endogeneity. On the other hand, while fixed 
effects greatly reduce the risk of omitted variable bias and endogeneity, they can eliminate 
many signals in the data and lead to substantially larger standard errors and p-values, 
especially when the variables of interest have little within-unit variation. Hence, we do not 
limit the interpretation of the results solely to the pooled model or to the fixed effects model. 
The estimation procedure for the fixed effects quantile regression model follows the work of 
Canay using a two-step estimator (Canay, 2011).3 The standard “within” estimator is used in 
the first step to extract the fixed effects from the conditional mean model. The dependent 
variable is transformed in the second step by subtracting the fixed effects. The quantile 
regression estimation is then conducted on the transformed dependent variable. Bootstrapped 
standard errors are used for both the baseline model and the fixed effects model.  
 																																																								
2 Following constructs in the previous literature, the MMC variables and the market are temporally lagged. 
3 The pooled model is estimated using Stata 12. The fixed effects model is estimated based on Canay’s R code 
“QRPanel,” which is available on the author’s web page. We adapt the code to accommodate the unbalanced 
panel structure in our data. 
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2.4 Results 
In this section, we present the results of the quantile regression. Because our interest 
lies in defection, (i.e., positive sales growth deviation, which is defined as the growth higher 
than the median growth in a market), especially large deviation, we estimate the model for 
the following 10 quantiles of the data: 0.5, 0.55, 0.6, 0.65, 0.7, 0.75, 0.8, 0.85, 0.9, and 0.95. 
Instead of the asymptotic standard errors, we bootstrap the residuals with 1000 replications. 
According to Efron & Tibshirani (1994), 1,000 bootstrap replications are sufficient enough 
for robust inference of parameters, standard errors and confidence intervals.4 
We show the results of the quantile regressions in Table 2.4 and 2.5. Model 1 is the 
pooled quantile regression, while Model 2 is the quantile regression with brand fixed effects. 
As the results suggest, the defection deterrence effect of MMC with competing brands is 
evident in the upper quantiles. It is obvious that the magnitude of the association between the 
positive sales growth deviation and MMC with competing brands varies significantly across 
different quantiles. The results from the two models are largely coherent. The effect of MMC 
with competing brands becomes significant beginning in the 80th percentile of the sales 
growth deviation in the pooled model, while it becomes significant beginning in the 85th 
percentile in the fixed effects model. The association increases steadily from the 85th 
percentile to the 95th percentile in both models, with effect sizes ranging from around 0.9% to 
more than 2% decrease in sales deviation. This suggests that MMC with competing brands 
works effectively as a defection deterrence mechanism only when the positive deviation of 
sales growth is larger in magnitude, which is understandable because small positive deviation
																																																								
4 We also run random effects and fixed effects Tobit models, following previous literature (Greve 2008). None 
of the MMC variables is statistically significant in either of the models. Because Tobit models inherently induce 
implausible assumptions, we do not report the results here. Detailed estimation results are available upon 
request. 
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Table 2.3 Pooled quantile regression 
  Model 1 
Quantile 50   55   60   65   70   75   80   85   90   95   
MarketGrowth -0.001128 
 
-0.003199 
 
-0.001538 
 
0.020817 
 
0.032579 
 
0.079094 *** 0.107807 *** 0.116827 *** 0.169185 *** 0.298555 *** 
  (0.008801) 
 
(0.012611) 
 
(0.018617) 
 
(0.023454) 
 
(0.023069) 
 
(0.026850) 
 
(0.031118) 
 
(0.041747) 
 
(0.049909) 
 
(0.093434)   
HHI 0.011243 
 
-0.012941 
 
-0.073860 
 
-0.100702 
 
-0.195976 
 
-0.151467 
 
-0.188538 
 
-0.072592 
 
-0.219082 
 
0.339771   
  (0.040954) 
 
(0.056934) 
 
(0.084788) 
 
(0.105750) 
 
(0.119630) 
 
(0.147654) 
 
(0.189656) 
 
(0.217303) 
 
(0.267360) 
 
(0.503232)   
Foreign -0.000534 
 
-0.001587 
 
-0.000960 
 
-0.001905 
 
-0.001432 
 
-0.001158 
 
-0.002486 
 
-0.000109 
 
-0.001868 
 
-0.000527   
  (0.000785) 
 
(0.001161) 
 
(0.001561) 
 
(0.001806) 
 
(0.001651) 
 
(0.001968) 
 
(0.002522) 
 
(0.003083) 
 
(0.004240) 
 
(0.007093)   
Single -0.008610 
 
-0.001940 
 
-0.030758 
 
-0.021722 
 
-0.045851 
 
-0.066470 ** -0.076270 * -0.117132 ** -0.111912 
 
0.016638   
  (0.015728) 
 
(0.019172) 
 
(0.023359) 
 
(0.030098) 
 
(0.031100) 
 
(0.032619) 
 
(0.043539) 
 
(0.059614) 
 
(0.073128) 
 
(0.203215)   
MarketShare -0.046713 * -0.095223 *** -0.122511 *** -0.184264 *** -0.242894 *** -0.304501 *** -0.425158 *** -0.613012 *** -0.804106 *** -1.558880 *** 
  (0.028172) 
 
(0.031147) 
 
(0.033253) 
 
(0.041346) 
 
(0.043968) 
 
(0.053738) 
 
(0.064861) 
 
(0.072144) 
 
(0.102408) 
 
(0.216102)   
SibMMC -0.000775 
 
0.000351 
 
-0.000654 
 
0.000833 
 
-0.000961 
 
0.002637 
 
0.005389 
 
0.004825 
 
0.005237 
 
0.003658   
  (0.002089) 
 
(0.002940) 
 
(0.003923) 
 
(0.004457) 
 
(0.004722) 
 
(0.005461) 
 
(0.006360) 
 
(0.007694) 
 
(0.009573) 
 
(0.016221)   
CompMMC 0.000577 
 
0.001406 
 
-0.000025 
 
0.000114 
 
-0.001753 
 
-0.002948 * -0.004677 ** -0.008857 *** -0.012935 *** -0.020820 *** 
  (0.000846) 
 
(0.001079) 
 
(0.001399) 
 
(0.001688) 
 
(0.001702) 
 
(0.001689) 
 
(0.002081) 
 
(0.002731) 
 
(0.003758) 
 
(0.006202)   
MarketMMC -0.015747 
 
-0.022774 
 
0.002808 
 
0.029898 
 
0.060184 
 
0.070243 
 
0.148090 
 
0.300268 ** 0.439810 ** 0.640769 ** 
  (0.032753) 
 
(0.045895) 
 
(0.058248) 
 
(0.069803) 
 
(0.073915) 
 
(0.081767) 
 
(0.105933) 
 
(0.127153) 
 
(0.175074) 
 
(0.275708)   
* p < 0.10; ** p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01 
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Table 2.4 Brand fixed effects quantile regression 
  Model 2 
Quantile 50   55   60   65   70   75   80   85   90   95   
MarketGrowth -0.005659 
 
-0.005423 
 
0.005098 
 
0.031538 
 
0.046346 
 
0.077139 * 0.105027 ** 0.116773 * 0.156610 ** 0.263180 ** 
  (0.024332) 
 
(0.02538) 
 
(0.029576) 
 
(0.036401) 
 
(0.040429) 
 
(0.043266) 
 
(0.050568) 
 
(0.064467) 
 
(0.077027) 
 
(0.111297)   
HHI 0.224932 ** 0.145757 
 
0.083205 
 
-0.004537 
 
-0.044968 
 
-0.012498 
 
-0.088892 
 
-0.103006 
 
-0.013641 
 
0.376960   
  (0.102196) 
 
(0.115458) 
 
(0.133444) 
 
(0.163556) 
 
(0.205811) 
 
(0.267998) 
 
(0.336643) 
 
(0.406102) 
 
(0.559401) 
 
(1.02946)   
Foreign 0.000797 
 
0.000317 
 
0.000092 
 
0.000028 
 
0.000425 
 
-0.000504 
 
-0.001816 
 
-0.001239 
 
0.000554 
 
0.003920   
  (0.001519) 
 
(0.001485) 
 
(0.001719) 
 
(0.002174) 
 
(0.002429) 
 
(0.002871) 
 
(0.003651) 
 
(0.005107) 
 
(0.007643) 
 
(0.011617)   
Single 0.003208 
 
0.000345 
 
-0.003716 
 
-0.027688 
 
-0.028614 
 
-0.031237 
 
-0.065363 
 
-0.097809 
 
-0.125157 
 
-0.185228   
  (0.027324) 
 
(0.024128) 
 
(0.025496) 
 
(0.029057) 
 
(0.028587) 
 
(0.033345) 
 
(0.051656) 
 
(0.076111) 
 
(0.129414) 
 
(0.244789)   
MarketShare -0.313075 *** -0.355479 *** -0.374844 *** -0.426595 *** -0.465487 *** -0.547672 *** -0.638735 *** -0.777315 *** -1.051126 *** -1.687260 *** 
  (0.042716) 
 
(-0.043780) 
 
(0.049463) 
 
(0.056827) 
 
(0.064779) 
 
(0.083585) 
 
(0.104331) 
 
(0.132345) 
 
(0.185793) 
 
(0.335241)   
SibMMC -0.008923 * -0.008646 * -0.007795 * -0.008193 
 
-0.004943 
 
-0.001264 
 
-0.003328 
 
0.001860 
 
-0.000531 
 
-0.000768   
  (0.004781) 
 
(0.004526) 
 
(0.004613) 
 
(0.005187) 
 
(0.005989) 
 
(0.006722) 
 
(0.008924) 
 
(0.010194) 
 
(0.014064) 
 
(0.024183)   
CompMMC 0.001414 
 
0.001032 
 
0.000423 
 
-0.001208 
 
-0.002344 
 
-0.002694 
 
-0.00456 
 
-0.008035 ** -0.013556 ** -0.023289 *** 
  (0.001342) 
 
(0.001335) 
 
(0.001531) 
 
(0.001827) 
 
(0.001772) 
 
(0.001993) 
 
(0.002841) 
 
(0.003798) 
 
(0.005825) 
 
(0.008862)   
MarketMMC -0.103037 * -0.080277 
 
-0.063143 
 
-0.036771 
 
0.027894 
 
-0.014605 
 
0.090462 
 
0.203394 
 
0.350699 * 0.613424   
  (0.057002) 
 
(0.052349) 
 
(0.05442) 
 
(-0.059290) 
 
(0.063296) 
 
(0.073199) 
 
(0.112253) 
 
(0.146882) 
 
(0.208249) 
 
(0.393434)   
* p < 0.10; ** p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01 
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can be attributed to stochastic variation and because true defection is accompanied by large 
positive deviation. Therefore, we find evidence supporting H1. Figure 2.2 presents a 
graphical illustration of the results. As the graph shows, the effect of CompMMC varies 
across quantiles of sales growth deviation becoming more evident for larger growth 
deviations. This finding validates our suspicion of the constant association between positive 
sales growth and MMC across the sales growth distribution implied by the Tobit model in our 
case and further validates the usage of quantile regression. 
 
Figure 2.2 Effect of MMC with competing brands 
Unlike the evident effect of MMC with competing brands, we find no statistically 
significant association between the positive sales growth deviation and MMC with siblings in 
either of  two models (see Figure 2.3). This result suggests that although an increase in 
the sheer number of MMC with siblings augments the detection probability, no significant 
evidence indicates that this increase will deter defection. Our result shows that brands do not 
appear responsive to MMC with siblings and that their defection behavior is not influenced 
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by the increase in MMC with siblings. It therefore implies that, with all else equal and with 
the same amount of MMC with competing brands, brands having MMC with siblings are not 
more active in initiating mutual forbearance than brands without MMC with siblings. Thus, 
we also find evidence supporting H3.  
 
Figure 2.3 Effect of MMC with sibling brands 
H2 is only partly supported because the two models diverge regarding the effects of 
market-level MMC. Despite having a significantly positive effect on sales growth deviation 
in the pooled model since the 85th quantile, the fixed effects model does not show significant 
effect of market-level MMC across the quantiles (see Figure 2.4). The results show that the 
effect size in the fixed model is smaller and the standard errors are larger.  
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Figure 2.4 Effect of market-level MMC 
 We also consider the potential interaction effect between market-level MMC and 
brand-level MMC. Previous literature has reported only marginal significance of this effect 
and suggested the preference for a simpler model without interaction terms (Greve, 2008). 
Similarly, we do not find any significant interaction effect between market-level MMC and 
brand-level MMC in separate models. The significance of the main effects remains 
unchanged in those models. Because models with interaction between market-level MMC 
and brand-level MMC do not provide additional information. Thus, we do not report the 
estimation results of those models.  
 The finding on market sales growth confirms that high-growth markets will witness 
higher defection likelihood because all participants in such markets will fight for more 
market share. There is strong support for the argument that larger brands are less likely to 
defect, as the coefficient of the market share is statistically significant with large effect size 
across almost all the percentiles in both models. However, we do not find any evidence of the 
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effect of market concentration on defection behavior. Therefore, higher market concentration 
does not necessarily make a market a more profitable place to defect, presumably because the 
higher market concentration did not bring about higher coordination among brands due to the 
deterioration of the overall industry financial environment. We do not find a significant effect 
of foreign brand counts. The single-market-brand indicator is significant only in the pooled 
model, presumably due to its limited within variation. However, this indicator is significant 
in only two of the ten quantiles in the pooled model. This implies that foreign brands and 
single market brands are not very different from domestic brands and multimarket brands in 
terms of their market behaviors.  
 
2.5 Implication 
 Using a quantile regression analysis, MMC with sibling brands and competing brands 
is empirically studied to test the difference in their effects in terms of defection deterrence 
under imperfect observability. In summary, our main findings are as follows: 
• Defection is unlikely if MMC with competing brands is sufficiently high. Therefore, 
MMC with competing brands functions effectively as a defection-deterrence 
mechanism. 
• Increasing the amount of MMC with sibling brands does not seem to decrease the 
propensity of defection. Therefore, no evidence indicates that MMC with sibling 
brands functions effectively as a defection-deterrence mechanism. 
Our work provides important managerial implications for group-level managers to validate 
the multi-brand multi-market overlapping strategy.  
 Our results indicate that, with the same number of MMC with competing brands, a 
brand that has MMC with its siblings does not have competitive disadvantage in the sense 
that it will not suffer from lower sales growth. In addition, with the same total amount of 
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MMC (with siblings and with competing brands combined), a brand that has MMC with its 
sibling brands will take more chances to strive for higher sales growth. It also implies that the 
stronger stance in competition taken by brands having MMC with their siblings may, but not 
necessarily, lead to sibling rivalry and cannibalization within groups. However, to maintain 
competitive edge, such competitive relationship can be essential for multi-brand multi-market 
manufacturing groups. Our finding validates automobile manufacturing groups’ current 
business strategy of multi-brand, multi-market overlap, as these groups benefit from superior 
brand performance.  
MMC and mutual forbearance can be a mixed blessing (Greve, 2008; Yu & Cannella, 
2013). Although short-term profitability might be ensured, inertia will be bred and brands’ 
competitiveness can be eroded in the long run. Thus, in the long run, markets can become 
more open, making mutual forbearance strategies more likely to fail (Ilinitch, D'Aveni, & 
Lewin, 1996). Therefore, automobile manufacturers must adjust their strategies to adapt to a 
changing competitive environment. Based on the results of this study, we offer some 
suggestions for multi-brand groups in designing an intra-group competition relationship. 
I. Groups should align brands according to the group’s strategic goals. Too-refined strategic 
goals may be difficult to align with an increase in the number of brands and the resulting 
intra-group competition. However, a simple goal, such as groups valuing market behavior in 
the interest of the overall group, should be conveyed to all brands.  
II. Given that strategic goals are aligned, groups should tolerate or induce intra-group 
competition as a way to foster overall competitive efficiency, which can be achieved by 
designing incentives such as compensation packages to reward better performance. 
Performance-based resource allocation or introducing new brands can also induce 
competition. However, when competition is too high to easily align strategic goals, groups 
need to consider reducing the number of brands.  
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III. Given I) and II), groups should adopt multi-brand, multi-market overlap. As suggested by 
our results, this strategy is unlikely to put groups at a disadvantaged competitive position. 
Nevertheless, as business environments are rapidly changing, the optimal behavior for brands 
may be to inevitably form a coalition and to initiate mutual forbearance. In this case, if the 
resulting mutual forbearance is in significant opposition to the group’s interest, groups need 
to reduce the overlap among sibling brands by either differentiating brands in terms of market 
focus or by reducing brands.  
 
2.6 Conclusion and Limitation 
Our paper is the first to study MMC with sibling brands and competing brands under 
imperfect observability in the automobile industry. Through the empirical analysis, we find 
that higher MMC with competing brands facilitates mutual forbearance. However, the same 
phenomenon does not necessarily apply to sibling brands. The resulting unwillingness of 
brands that have MMC with siblings to initiate mutual forbearance is not necessarily bad for 
the manufacturing group, as this will shield the group from having lower sales growth than 
single brand manufacturers. Our finding provides support for the business practices of multi-
brand, multi-market automobile manufacturing groups. Applying quantile regression, we 
show the advantage of this method when the research interest lies in the non-central location 
of the dependent variable and when the conditional variance of the dependent variable is 
heterogeneous.  
Although our paper offers important contributions to the existing literature, it also has 
some limitations. While product segments constitute valid markets used in MMC analysis, 
future research can extend this study by combining both product markets and geographic 
markets at the same time (Alcantara & Mitsuhashi, 2015). It offers the possibility to study 
mutual forbearance under imperfect observability on multiple dimensions. Incorporating both 
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types of markets can lead to more insight into the study of MMC with sibling brands and 
competing brands across product segments and across geographic markets. In addition, 
replications should be conducted in different industries, as MMC can work differently in 
capital-intensive industries and labor-intensive industries, for example. This design can even 
provide a more robust analysis of the research question. 
 Moreover, in future research, a behavioral perspective should be considered. 
Specifically, in the context of MMC with sibling brands, the factor of managers at the brand 
level and at the group level can be included to relax the full rationality assumption. In 
addition, future studies can expand our study by including the group-level strategy variables, 
which offer the possibility to analyze the effectiveness of MMC under various higher-level 
strategy settings. The results can potentially provide crucial managerial implications for 
groups that govern multiple brands. 
 Furthermore, future studies can extend empirical models to test recent developments 
in theories regarding MMC under imperfect monitoring (Kobayashi & Ohta, 2008; 
Kobayashi & Ohta, 2012; Yamamoto, 2007). We wish our work would encourage more 
studies in related directions. 
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3 The Social Exposure Effect of Coupon Trading on Coupon Redemption 
 
Abstract 
Digital coupons are gaining considerable momentum due to the combination of 
gloomy economic outlook and advanced digital technology. Compared to paper coupons, it is 
much more convenient for consumers to trade digital coupons.  In this paper, we examine the 
phenomenon of coupon trading, which repeatedly expose consumers to product related 
information. Different from existing literature that focuses on coupon retailers as the source 
of exposure, we base our empirical analysis on social exposure induced among consumers 
themselves. We apply our analysis on a disaggregated user and product level longitudinal 
dataset from a Swiss online coupon service provider over a time span of 12 months. Our 
results suggest that due to repeated exposure towards product related information, coupon 
trading can effectively enhance coupon redemption likelihood. This study extends existing 
literature by bridging coupon literature with exposure effect, offering important implication 
to researchers and practitioners. 
 
Keywords: digital coupon, coupon service provider, coupon trading, exposure effect, coupon 
redemption, multilevel modeling, event history analysis 
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3.1 Introduction  
 Nowadays, coupons are often digitalized, enabling them to be easily carried and 
exchanged among coupon users. Digital coupons are more convenient avenues for coupon 
usage compared to traditional paper coupons (Chiou-Wei & Inman, 2008). According to 
Inmar’ s estimate, in 2013 along, the redemption of digital coupons in U.S. reached 66 
million, marking a 141 percent increase over 2012 (Inmar, 2014). One important difference 
distinguishes digital coupons from traditional paper coupons is that consumers are enabled to 
collect and trade coupons freely.5 The immediate result of the opportunity to trade coupons, 
apart from matching each other’s needs, is the emergence of additional channels where 
consumers are exposed to product related information whenever other consumers suggest 
them for a trade. Such channels can take the form of a dedicated website (Hotcouponworld), 
a functional part of an online forum (Steam), a user group (Yahoo, Facebook) or even ad-hoc 
coupon trade clubs organized among peers, friends or colleagues.6 It leaves us wondering 
whether coupon trading among consumers may increase coupon redemption rate due to the 
increased exposure towards coupons. This can be of vital importance for various online third-
party coupon service providers, who emerged accompanying the boom in digital coupons and 
rely heavily on coupon redemption in their business models. Against this backdrop, we 
examine in this paper the social exposure effect of coupon trading on coupon redemption, 
which is the change in redemption likelihood attributed to coupon trading due to the exposure 
towards product related information induced among consumers themselves.  
Our work is grounded in the general literature stream of exposure effects. The 
theoretical framework of exposure effects has a long history across different disciplines. It 																																																								
5 By trading coupons, we refer specifically to the situation that a user gives coupons to another user and/or 
receives coupons in return.  Thus, no real money transaction is involved in the process. 
6 Hotcouponworld: http://www.hotcouponworld.com/forums/coupon-trading/ 
   Steam: https://steamcommunity.com/groups/Coupon-Trading-Group 
   Yahoo: https://groups.yahoo.com/neo/groups/Coupon_Exchange/info 
   Facebook: https://www.facebook.com/pages/Coupon-Exchange/165938863465201 
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has been applied to online settings in modern literatures (Chatterjee, Hoffman, & Novak, 
2003) (Zhu & Zhang, 2010). Through empirical analyses built on a unique dataset with 
1,923,405 coupon trade records, 32,603 users and 265 products from a Swiss online third-
party coupon service provider over a time span of 12 months, we find that coupon trading 
positively affects consumers’ coupon redemption likelihood due to the repeated exposure 
towards product related information. 
This study makes contributions to both the academia and the industry. The importance 
of incorporating social elements as a marketing strategy in the coupon industry has been 
highlighted in previous literature (Dholakia, 2011) (Dholakia & Tsabar, 2011) (Dholakia, 
2012) (Kumar & Rajan, 2012). With a special focus on the social exposure effect of coupon 
trading on coupon redemption, this work differentiate itself from previous work where 
coupon trading is monetary and its ability to expose consumers to product related information 
is consequently impossible to study (Su, Zheng, & Sun, 2014). It also differs from previous 
research where the source of the exposure is retailers and the trading-induced exposure 
among consumers themselves is overlooked (Venkatesan & Farris, 2012). Thus, our work 
extends the existing coupon literature. In addition, while the majority of existing coupon 
literature related to exposure effect has paid their attention on coupon manufacturers’ sales of 
products, our study has a different research priority on the online coupon service providers’ 
redemption incidents. The rising global interest in coupons as a result of economic recession 
and advance in information technology attracts much attention and effort from practitioners 
and entrepreneurs to establish their own coupon sites. Unlike coupon manufacturers/retailers, 
these coupon service providers heavily rely on coupon redemptions to generate revenues, to 
build up reputation, and to draw external investment. With dedicated research efforts on 
coupon redemption, our work provides important managerial implications for the operation 
of online coupon platforms. 
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Moreover, the contribution of this study is also empirical. Although coupon trading 
has existed for quite a while through the form of coupon exchange clubs or coupon corners 
within various online forums, related research is very scarce largely due to the problem of 
data availability. With our unique longitudinal dataset, we are able to empirically analyze the 
social exposure effect of coupon trading on coupon redemption on a disaggregated consumer- 
and product-level. Compared to the majority of coupon researches that are based on 
aggregated level of product/brand or consumers, a disaggregated analysis offers the 
opportunity to capture the complexity in consumers’ behaviors across different products. 
Since consumers hold coupons on different products for different length of time before 
redemption or expiration, the empirical analyses are built on the multilevel framework due to 
its power on clustered data and its lack of requirement on balanced panel data. Specifically, 
we adopt a cross-classified discrete time event history analysis to account for the temporal 
dependency and the unobserved heterogeneity of both consumers and products. It is 
especially important for coupon studies since a consumer can have coupons on different 
product and coupons on the same product can be held by different consumers. Ignoring the 
temporal dependency and the non-nested data structure can lead to invalid standard errors, 
which impedes correct inference of the effect. 
The fast-growing yet under-researched digital coupon practice calls for empirical 
studies to guide its future development as it is attracting more and more vendors and 
consumers due to high penetration of digital technologies. By applying the results of this 
research, marketers and managers can effectively utilize coupon trading to lift the redemption 
rate because it enables consumers themselves as source of advertisement on products. 
The paper is organized as follows: in Section 2, we review related literatures and the 
theoretical framework. In Section 3, we present the general setting, our longitudinal dataset 
and the empirical model. The estimation results and robust checks are then presented and 
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discussed in Section 4. Based on the results, we discuss both theoretical and practical 
implications, and conclude the paper in Section 5. 
 
3.2 Related Literatures and Theoretic Framework 
3.2.1 Digital Coupons and Online Third-Party Coupon Service Providers 
Digital coupons are gaining more shares in total coupon usage thanks to the 
advancement of IT technology. Due to their unique characteristics such as easy dissemination, 
share and storage, digital coupons are more powerful than traditional coupons. Besides, they 
can more easily assume social functions than traditional coupons. This is best illustrated via 
the widely adopted practice of blending online digital coupons with social elements in recent 
years (Kumar & Rajan, 2012). Compared to traditional coupons, digital coupons also offer a 
far more direct and convenient vehicle than traditional coupons to reach consumers (Chiou-
Wei & Inman, 2008). The paperless feature of digital coupons not only frees consumers from 
non-monetary efforts such as clipping the coupons or remembering to bring the coupons at 
redemption, it also makes social interactions among consumers such as exchanging their 
coupons more conveniently. Data collection on digital coupons is more readily available. It 
would be very difficult, if not impossible, to track trading activities on traditional coupons.  
Accompanying the surge in digital coupons, a handful number of online third-party 
coupon service providers have emerged due to the lucrative business opportunities and 
revenue gains (Kumar & Rajan, 2012). The existence of online third-party coupon service 
providers, which usually take the form of a dedicated website or a conglomerate of websites, 
pool the resources of coupons and facilitate the redistribution of coupons among consumers. 
Traditionally, paper coupons and coupon manufacturers/retailers have been the center of the 
coupon literature. Recently, we have witnessed research efforts focused on coupon service 
providers, which has been overlooked in the past (Luo, Andrews, Song, & Aspara, 2014). Yet, 
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we believe that there are unexplored areas within the domain of digital coupons and coupon 
service providers that demand thoughtful research. As a promotional strategy, one of the most 
important performance measurements of digital coupons, similar to traditional ones, is the 
redemption rate. This is especially true for online third-party coupon service providers as 
they generate revenue, build up reputation, negotiate terms with suppliers and draw external 
investment based on coupon redemptions. Therefore, it is very important for both the 
academia and the industry to find innovative ways to lift coupon service providers’ 
redemptions rate. The pooled coupon and consumer resources on coupon service providers’ 
platforms indicate the possibility of large-scale coupon trading activities. To explore viable 
business models for coupon service providers and to echo the call for more researches on 
coupon redemption behavior due to the increase in coupon usage (Venkatesan & Farris, 
2012), we explore the social exposure effect of trading on coupon redemption in this paper.  
3.2.2 Coupon Trading and Exposure Effect 
 In his seminal paper, Zajonc found that the mere repeated exposure is sufficient to 
enhance one’s evaluation of the stimulus, which can be interpreted as preference (Zajonc, 
1968) (Zajonc, 1980). Though not widely applied in coupon literature, mere exposure effect 
can surely fit in this stream of literature. According to the multibenefit theory, consumers do 
derive value from mere exposure to coupons (just seeing the promotion for a product) 
(Chandon, Wansink, & Laurent, 2000). This seems indicating that coupon trading can lead to 
value derivation and preference on the underlying product, operationalized here as the 
redemption of the corresponding coupons, because it repeatedly expose consumers to product 
related information. 
As shown in Figure 3.1, the digital coupons studied in this paper contains both 
graphical and textual information on the product. With coupon trading enabled, a focal 
consumer will be exposed to this product related information when he receives trade requests  
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Figure 3.1 Example of a product on the platform 
where trading partners offer coupons on the focal product to him. The more trade requests he 
has receives on the focal product, the more he has been exposed to such product related 
information. Therefore, based on the above-mentioned theories, we propose a positive 
relationship between the social exposure effect of coupon trading and coupon redemption:  
• The cumulative number of trade proposals from which one has been offered coupons 
on a product is positively associated with his redemption likelihood of the product, 
given everything else equal. 
Nonetheless, we also have to admit that with the increasing amount of digital coupons and 
trading activities, consumers’ mental costs can also increase accordingly. When consumers 
are overwhelmed by the large amount of coupons and trading activities, the increasing burden 
on consumers to remember and to process relevant information would potentially 
compromise the social exposure effect of coupon trading. This also echoes the divergence 
regarding the pattern of exposure effect. While the perceptual fluency theory supports a 
monotonically increasing pattern of exposure effect (Bornstein & D'Agostino, 1992), an 
		 48 
inverted U-shape saturation pattern is advocated by the two-factor theory (Berlyne, 1970). 
Therefore, to ensure the robustness of this study, we also consider an inverted U-shape 
pattern of the social exposure effect of coupon trading to reflect potential satiation in the 
effect. More details will be given in the modeling section. 
Coupon trading has already existed in the forms of online forums’ coupon corners or 
coupon exchange club, yet there is very limited research related to this phenomenon. To the 
best of our knowledge, Su et al.’s paper (2014) is the only work addressing the coupon-
trading phenomenon. It should be noted that our study is very different from the work of 
theirs. We have a rather different research focus and research topic than theirs. By focusing 
on monetary-based coupon trading, Su et al. explore the benefit of price discrimination in 
coupon practice for coupon retailers and coupon manufacturers. In this study, however, we 
pay our research attention to non-monetary-based coupon trading. This distinction is vital for 
our research question because it is only possible to empirically quantify the social exposure 
effect of coupon trading on coupon redemption on non-monetary-based coupon trades. 
Moreover, we base our analysis on third-party coupon service providers rather than coupon 
retailers/manufacturers. Therefore, our work explores previously uncharted territory of 
coupon trading.   
 
3.3 Data and Model 
3.3.1 General Setting 
This study collects data from a Swiss online coupon service provider that was 
founded at the end of 2011. The company, which prefers to remain anonymous, focused 
primarily on coupon distribution and coupon redemption for generating revenue. The most 
distinguishable feature of the company that differentiates it from competitors is the facilitated 
trading mechanism. Instead of making itself the sole source of disseminating product related 
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information, the company facilitates online coupon trading where consumers are subject to 
additional exposure towards product related information. The company has witnessed a 
steady growth in its consumer base, which has grown at an annual rate of 114%.   
Different categories of products are available on the platform, ranging across beauty 
products, electronic products, fashion products, food products, leisure/fun products, home 
products and travel products. Every product comes along with a set of ten unique digital 
coupons. Each coupon equates a ten percent discount off the product’s listed price. The more 
unique coupons a consumer collects, the more discount he receives additively. Thus, the 
consumers can redeem the coupons and get the product by paying the remaining price after 
the discount conditioning on the number of unique coupons they have. Products are usually 
available on the platform for long enough time to ensure consumers with adequate time to 
collect and trade coupons.   
Consumers are exposed to product related information in two ways. Firstly, every 
consumer receives two random coupons for daily login. These randomly issued coupons are 
very similar to traditional freestanding inserts (FSI) appearing on newspapers and direct 
mails in the sense that consumers passively receive them from coupon distributors. Secondly, 
coupon trading enables consumers to induce exposure towards product related information 
among them. To facilitate coupon trading, the company implemented a search engine on its 
platform. This enables consumers conveniently find others who possess coupons of a product 
that they are looking for. They can then send trade requests with their offers of coupons. 
Consumers who receive trade requests are then exposed to information on the products 
underlying the coupons.  
3.3.2 Advantage of this study 
 The setting and data of this study provides two potential advantages. Firstly, as we 
mention earlier, the random coupons received upon daily login serve as a plausible proxy of 
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FSI. This provides us with an opportunity to compare the added value of coupon trading to 
the simple FSI without coupon trading. Secondly, every consumer is offered an online 
tutorial upon registration to learn the mechanism of the platform. Together with the 
facilitation of the in-platform search engine, the required effort on the consumer side to get 
involved in trading is minimum. Thirdly, the platform offers the opportunity to ship the 
redeemed products to consumers’ delivery addresses. Previous literature has indicated that 
coupon usage can be negatively affected by the factor of being perceived ‘cheap’ (Dhar & 
Hoch, 1996) (Brumbaugh & Rosa, 2009). With the possibility of product shipping, 
interaction with other people such as shopping assistants at retailer sites can be avoided. 
These additional controlling factors make this study arguably more powerful than previous 
related researches. 
3.3.3 Data 
Our longitudinal dataset contains consumer and product information ranging from 
January 2012 to December 2012 for one full year. During this period, the platform records 
1,923,405 coupon trades, 32,603 consumers, 265 products and a total number of 7,773 
redemptions. As shown in Figure 3.2, the redemption rate has been rather low. Though 
reached around 1.3% at its peak, the redemption rate has constantly been below 0.5%7. 
During the period of this study, the company offered products in 8 different categories, 
namely automobile related products, beauty products, electronic products, fashion products, 
food products, leisure/fun products, home products and travel products.  
The empirical analysis is built on a monthly level. Thus, our longitudinal data has the 
sample size of 2,224,838 observations. Our primary reasons of building the model on a 
monthly base are twofold. From the data and modeling point of view, a combination of the 
																																																								
7 Though the redemption incidents had a generally increasing trend, the even faster increase in the consumer 
base has kept the redemption rate at a rather low level. The surge in redemption rate in March is likely due to 
more favored products on the platform. 
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large sample size and the complexity error structure in the cross-classified model indicate that 
a monthly analysis is more practical. A weekly or daily setup would result in the estimation 
of the model beyond our computational capacity in terms of both the memory and the 
computational time. Monthly setup can also eliminate any unwanted noise occurred at the 
daily and weekly level. More importantly, from the business point of view, a monthly 
analysis is in line with the operation of the platform and fits better for its business. The 
platform makes strategic moves based on their monthly financial reports. The executives are 
interested in monthly performance rather than weekly. Considering the fact that the platform 
does not vary its business strategy week by week, we deem that a monthly analysis is indeed 
adequate and appropriate for this study. 
 
Figure 3.2 Overview of the redemption rate on the platform 
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3.3.4 Empirical Model 
In this section, we present our empirical models. In essence, what we model is the 
binary outcome of whether a consumer redeems a product or not. However, ordinary logistic 
regression ignores temporal dependencies and leads to inefficient estimation and incorrect 
standard errors. Besides, ignoring consumer- and product-heterogeneity can also bias 
estimation results. Hence, we adopt multilevel discrete-time event history models as our 
modeling strategy. With the advancement in computing software, event history analysis with 
complex data structure has been widely used across different disciplines (Singer & Willett, 
2003) (Steele, 2008). The discrete time hazard, defined as the conditional probability that 
coupons are redeemed in period i given that the redemption has not occurred in earlier 
periods, can be notated as: ℎ" = $% &" ≠ 0|&* = 0, , < .  
The corresponding event history model in this case can be estimated with the following form 
(we adopt the notation advocated by Browne, Goldstein & Rasbash (2001) for cross-
classified models to avoid complex classification of variable subscripts): /01.2(ℎ") = 56 + 589" + 5:9_<=" + 5>?@A0,B%C" + 5DE.FC," + 5G$H,2I" + 5J$H,2KI"+ 5L$H,2<9" + 5MNO1P" + 5QR2ℎC%9" + 586S,,BC" + 5889CTB%C"+ 58:STO.2C" + 58>ICUC%" + 58D$%.VC" + 58GICWXB%" + 58J?@A.%C"+ 58LX.,V0BT2" + 58MNW" + 58QY0/" + 5:6ZB[$%0WBV2" + 5:8NB20"+ 5::\CHB2&" + 5:>?/CV2%0" + 5:D]H,ℎ.0T" + 5:G]00W" + 5:J]BT"+ 5:LP0[C" + 5:M^1" + 5:Q^2" + 5>6^3" + Bbcdefgh(")(:) + Bgdi*fjkc(")(>)  Bgdi*fjkc(")(>) ~Z(0, mf(>): )  Bbcdefgh(")(:) ~Z(0, mf(:): )  
Different from ordinary logistic regression, in this equation T and T_2 is a quadratic 
function of time that enters the model to parsimoniously capture the baseline hazard. The 
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baseline hazard also indicates that duration dependence is assumed in the model. Event 
history analysis requires a meaningful starting time, after which the subjects are under risk of 
the occurrence of the event. In this study, we set the starting time as the first time a focal 
consumer acquires a coupon of the focal product, and the event being the redemption of the 
focal product by the focal consumer. T, in this case, is the months passed since the consumer 
acquired his first coupon on the focal product, given that he has not redeemed the product yet. 
Since every consumer can have coupons on multiple products at any given time and multiple 
consumers can hold coupons on the same product at any given time, our sample constitutes a 
cross-classified structure rather than a pure nested structure. The two-variance components Bgdi*fjkc(")(>)  and Bbcdefgh(")(:)  are used to capture the unobserved heterogeneity in consumers 
and products. The estimation results of these two parameters serve as a test on the assumption 
of unobserved heterogeneity (Singer & Willett, 2003).  
As introduced in earlier section, the more trade requests a focal consumer has 
received on the focal product, the more he has been exposed to product related information. 
We use the cumulative trade requests (UW_Expo) that consumer k has received in which 
consumer k is exposed to product j to measure the social exposure effect of coupon trading in 
Model 1. To test if there is satiation in the social exposure effect of coupon trading, we also 
include quadratic terms of UW_Expo (i.e., UW_Expo, UW_Expo_2) in Model 2 to test the 
potential inverted U-shape pattern. The quadratic terms also serve as a test on the assumption 
of linear additivity (Singer & Willett, 2003).  
3.3.5 Control Variables 
To correctly reveal the social exposure effect of coupon trading, it is important to take 
consumers’ personal attraction to different products into consideration. Coupon proneness is 
broadly defined as the increased propensity to respond to a purchase offer because the 
coupon form of the offer positively affects purchase evaluations (Lichtenstein, Netemeyer, & 
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Burton, 1990). Previous literatures suggest that coupon redemption is influence by general 
coupon proneness and product-category-specific coupon proneness (Bawa, Srinivasan, & 
Srivastava, 1997) (Swaminathan & Bawa, 2005). Inline with previous literatures, we include 
a set of variables (Likes, PastR, PastCR) to control consumer k’s coupon proneness on 
product j. Consumers can ‘like’ a product by clicking the corresponding button on the 
platform. They can also remove their ‘like’ anytime they want. Hence, the product ‘like’ 
variable of consumer k on product j (Likes) is time varying in our study. Together with 
consumer k’s general past redemption experience, (i.e., past redemption incidents (PastR) 
and his past redemption experience in the product category same as product j (PastCR), we 
control consumers’ proneness across different products.   
Homophily is another influential factor in our analysis. Previous research has 
suggested that consumers are more likely to interact with people who are similar to them 
(Feick & Higie, 1992). In our case, active consumers may tend to engage in trading activities 
with other consumers with relatively similar active level. We investigate the extent to which 
such similarity among trading partners affects consumers’ redemption probability. To capture 
the homophily between a focal consumer and his trading partners, we adopt a method similar 
to the work by Nitzan & Libai (Nitzan & Libai, 2011). We use three variables to capture the 
similarity in activity level: the cumulative number of products of which at least one coupon 
of the product was possessed (CProduct), the cumulative number of trades initiated (CTrads), 
and the cumulative months that a focal consumer log onto the platform for at least once 
(CMonth). Equal weights are assigned for each variable, and the sum of the weighted 
measures is used to evaluate the homophily between the trading partners. We now explain in 
detail how the similarity measure is composed.  Instead of deciding a match/no match of each 
variable between the trading partners on a rather subjective criterion, we adopt a ratio 
measure to indicate consumer k’s similarity to his trading partner m:   
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Pn,j = 13×[(1 − KXCH/n − KXCH/j[H@(KXCH/n, KXCH/j)) + (1 − K9%HWCn − K9%HWCj[H@(K9%HWCn, K9%HWCj)) + (1
− Kr0T2ℎn − Kr0T2ℎj[H@(Kr0T2ℎn − Kr0T2ℎj))] 
This measure is bounded on [0,1] with 1 indicating full match and 0 for no match.  Based on 
this measure, we can calculate consumer k’s average homophily with his trading partners 
(AvgH) in month t as follows: 
NO1Pn,h = Pn,jj∈uvw,xZuvw,x  
where m is a trading partner of consumer k ([ ∈ 9$n,h) in month t and Zuvw,   is the total 
number of consumer k’s trading partners in month t. 
Selection is a concern over the validity of this study. Consumers that self-select 
themselves into frequent exchange of coupons with others can be systematically different 
from those who exchange coupons less frequently in terms of both the propensity to redeem 
coupons and the likelihood to receive trade requests. In another word, more involved 
consumers may be more likely to receive more trade requests, having more exposure towards 
coupons and they are also more likely to redeem them. To avoid potential selection bias and 
endogeneity, we need to control how involved consumers are. Arguably, more involved 
consumers will be more active in making referrals and be more successful in both trading and 
redemption. Hereby, we include consumers’ referral intensity (Refer), which is measured by 
the cumulative number of people whom they have successful invited on to the platform; their 
past successful trading experience (PastST) in the model; and consumers’ past redemption 
experience (PastR) to make sure the social exposure effect of coupon trading captured in the 
model is not attributed to the alternative explanation of consumer involvement. 
 Several other consumer side variables are included in our model. As we argued in 
earlier sections, the increase in coupon trading may also induce mental burden on consumers 
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with respect to memorizing and processing information. Hence, by including monthly trading 
activities by consumers on products other than the focal one (OtherT) in the model, we 
investigate the potential downside of coupon trading. One of the advantages of this study, as 
explained earlier, is that in our case the randomly issued coupons upon daily login functions 
as a proxy to FSI. This offers a plausible comparison between the effect of the exposure 
towards FSI and the social exposure effect of coupon trading. We therefore include 
consumers’ cumulative receipt of coupons on the focal product, which are issued upon daily 
login (Issue). Other variables on the consumer side include the tenures of consumers on the 
platform (Tenure), measured by the number of months since consumers first login on the 
platform; whether consumers were invited to the platform or not (Invite). 
On the product side, we include time invariant product characteristics such as product 
prices (Price), products’ redemption durations (RedDur) and product category dummies 
(Auto, Beauty, Electro, Fashion, Food, Fun, Home). Time varying product variables include 
the remaining time until redemption expiration of the focal product (Expire) and the 
percentage discounts (Discount) enjoyed by consumers. It is worth noting that since the 
cumulative savings on products which consumers can enjoy depend on consumers’ 
possession of different coupons on the products, product discounts (Discount) in our study is 
thus time varying and consumer specific. Monthly advertising expenditure on the focal 
product (Ad) and its monthly total on-platform trading volume (Vol) are also included.   
We additionally control factors such as product availability and seasonality through 
the monthly number of products available on the platform (NumProduct) and the quarter 
dummies (Q1, Q2, Q3). All variables are mean-centered whenever appropriate. In Table 3.1, 
we report the definition and the summary statistics of the variables. Before proceeding to the 
estimation issues, we spend a few lines giving an overview of the summary statistics. 
Average consumers’ redemption experience is low, which is not surprising given the overall 
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low redemption rate on the platform. On average, consumers are not very similar to their 
trading partners. The monthly trading activities on non-focal products are moderate for 
average consumers. However, their effect on mental cost, which might affect redemption 
likelihood, is unknown. Product availability seems abundant on the platform and the time for 
redemption is enough for consumers. It is relatively difficult for consumers to collect 
coupons on a focal product simply through daily login. This can explain the fact that trading 
volume is high, which shows a strong consumer base and user engagement on the platform. 
This again underscores the importance to study the social exposure effect of coupon trading. 
The platform does not spend heavily on advertising neither does it rely on referral for 
consumer acquisition since average consumers’ referral intensity is pretty low. The consumer 
base of the platform and the relatively low discount at which consumers redeem products 
show the potential of digital coupon and coupon trading as a lucrative business practice. 
Table 3.1 Definition of variables and summary statistics 
Variable Definition Mean Std. Dev. 
UW_Expo Unweighted exposure effect 1.745625 5.258755 
PastR Consumers' past redemption experience 0.7169556 2.097253 
PastCR Consumers' past category-specific redemption experience 0.1315512 0.5970338 
PastST Consumers’ past successful trading experience 39.31887 94.04235 
AvgH Consumers' average homophily 0.3616225 0.2079652 
OtherT Consumers' monthly trading activities on non-focal products 23.72214 91.57626 
Issue Consumers' cumulated received coupons upon daily login 0.4314939 0.756912 
Tenure Consumer tenure 3.651432 2.448263 
Refer Consumers' previous referral intensity 0.2381616 1.95027 
Price Prices of products  428.9115 807.7141 
RedDur Redemption durations of products 1.648273 1.285504 
Expire Time to redemption expiration of products 1.572884 1.610407 
Discount Discounts of products 0.1122133 0.1317452 
Ad Products’ monthly advertising expenditure  33.6392 157.2012 
Vol Products’ monthly trading proposal volumes  2150.312 2685.471 
NumProduct Monthly available products on the platform  63.38418 9.498872 
Detailed operationalization of variables is presented in the 'Empirical Model' section 
 Quasi-likelihood methods (MQL, PQL), unlike MCMC (Monte Carlo Markov Chain), 
have been shown to bias the results when estimating models with non-normal response 
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variables (Rodriguez & Goldman, 1995) (Goldstein & Rasbash, 1996). In addition, cross-
classified data structure induces much less memory burden when estimated via MCMC rather 
than IGLS (Iterative Generalized Least Squares) (Rasbash & Browne, 2008). Therefore, the 
binary outcome with cross-classified data structure leads us to adopt a Bayesian approach. 
The model is estimated using MCMC implemented in the software MLwiN Version 2.34 
(Rasbash, Steele, Browne, & Goldstein, 2014) (Browne W. J., 2014) (Leckie & Charlton, 
2013). Diffuse priors are used to ensure coefficients are not affected by starting values and 
prior specifications (Venkatesan & Farris, 2012). We use the default priors provided by 
MLwiN, namely gamma priors are used for the variance parameters 
(mf(>): ~yH[[H(0.001,0.001), mf(:): ~yH[[H(0.001,0.001)). And for the rest of 
parameters, uniform priors are used (A(5) ∝ 1). All the models are estimated with a burn-in 
length of 5,000 iterations and 80,000 runs to achieve effective sample size (ESS) over 100 for 
all variables and variance components. To improve mixing, the reparameterization methods 
of orthogonalization and hierarchical centering is used (Browne, Steele, Golalizade, & Green, 
2009). Orthogonalization replaces the set of covariates with an alternative group of covariates 
that span the same parameter space but are orthogonal. Hierarchical centering 
reparameterizes the model by replacing the residuals and centering them around a function of 
the covariates. In our work, the models are centered at the consumer level. Given the size of 
the data and the complexity of the models, estimation is cumbersome and time consuming. 
The whole estimation is run on multiple instances on Intel® Xeon® processors with 2.27GHz, 
2.39GHz CPUs and 20.0GB internal memory.  
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3.4 Results 
3.4.1 General Model Fit 
 In terms of model fit, we compare models using the Deviance Information Criterion 
(DIC) (Spiegelhalter, Best, Carlin, & van der Linde, 2002). The estimation results of Model 
1-2 are present in Table 3.2. Model 1 (DIC: 31273.9543), which operationalize the social 
exposure effect of coupon trading as cumulative trade requests received, serves as the 
baseline model of our analysis. In Model 2 (DIC: 31241.0058), a quadratic function of the 
social exposure effect of coupon trading (i.e., UW_Expo and UW_Expo_2) is used to 
investigate potential satiation in the effect. The DIC indicates that the inclusion of quadratic 
terms improves model fit. The variance components (i.e., the consumer and product random 
effects) in both models show significant results. This confirms the validity of our cross-
classified modeling strategy. 
3.4.2 Exposure Effect 
 The positive and significant result of UW_Expo (0.008362 (0.001296)) in Model 1 
supports our hypothesis that coupon trading increases coupon redemption likelihood due to 
the repeated exposure towards product related information induced among consumers 
themselves. On the other hand, we also find evidence that an overwhelming amount of such 
social exposure can lead to a satiation in its positive effect. The result of Model 2 suggests 
that if certain threshold is passed, the positive social exposure effect of coupon trading 
gradually diminishes (UW_Expo: 0.017825 (0.002236);	UW_Expo_2: -0.000085 
(0.000018)).8 Our result is thus empirically in line with the two-factor theory which suggests 
that the positive effect of repeated exposure can diminish due to satiation. The positive effect 
of coupon trading due to social exposure can also be translated into higher revenue gains for 
the platform. Conditional on the holding time of coupons and on the current discount, the 																																																								
8 It is worth noting however that around 99% of our sample does not cross the inflection point and hence not 
suffering from the diminishing effect. 
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social exposure effect of coupon trading leads to a higher redemption likelihood, meaning 
that consumers will be more likely to spend money on products and the duration of time until 
consumers spending money on products is shorter, ceteris paribus. This is critical for online 
coupon service providers, a point that we will discuss later in the paper. 
Table 3.2 Results of the main analysis   
  Model 1     Model 2     
Intercept -11.535307 (0.290924) *** -11.532254 (0.289521) *** 
T 0.135775 (0.037037) *** 0.121488 (0.036733) *** 
T_2 -0.214405 (0.008747) *** -0.212644 (0.008667) *** 
UW_Expo 0.008362 (0.001296) *** 0.017825 (0.002236) *** 
UW_Expo_2    -0.000085 (0.000018) *** 
Likes 0.387943 (0.042042) *** 0.337724 (0.042713) *** 
PastR 0.009084 (0.01058) 
 
0.009251 (0.010592) 
 
PastCR 0.040464 (0.020458) ** 0.038472 (0.020746) * 
PastST 0.000384 (0.000234) 
 
0.000345 (0.00023) 
 
AvgH 1.748645 (0.159069) *** 1.720616 (0.159818) *** 
OtherT 0.000467 (0.000137) *** 0.000434 (0.000135) *** 
Issue 0.065061 (0.012191) *** 0.065329 (0.01217) *** 
Tenure -0.012207 (0.012795) 
 
-0.008677 (0.012702) 
 
Invite -0.117162 (0.050896) ** -0.113668 (0.051917) ** 
Refer 0.005538 (0.005573) 
 
0.005362 (0.005489) 
 
Price -0.000057 (0.000062) 
 
-0.000054 (0.000062) 
 
RedDur 0.304391 (0.084334) *** 0.308228 (0.084032) *** 
Expire -0.786584 (0.0398) *** -0.786533 (0.039537) *** 
Discount 14.440729 (0.152794) *** 14.31478 (0.13979) *** 
Ad 0.000781 (0.000163) *** 0.000778 (0.000164) *** 
Vol 0.00001 (0.00001) 
 
0.000008 (0.00001) 
 
NumProduct 0.01638 (0.002659) *** 0.016172 (0.002625) *** 
Auto 1.096499 (0.659777) 
 
1.075955 (0.693865) 
 
Beauty 0.25862 (0.436908) 
 
0.257903 (0.453691) 
 
Electro 2.68306 (0.387942) *** 2.671043 (0.374534) *** 
Fashion 0.913535 (0.313401) *** 0.934004 (0.310913) *** 
Food 0.884439 (0.32909) *** 0.910648 (0.346251) *** 
Fun 0.444715 (0.329314) 
 
0.431771 (0.348762) 
 
Home 0.247497 (0.309489) 
 
0.281731 (0.320831) 
 
Q1 1.099406 (0.187309) *** 1.099814 (0.188186) *** 
Q2 -0.272142 (0.124487) ** -0.267875 (0.123771) ** 
Q3 -0.271304 (0.075343) *** -0.269098 (0.075965) *** 
Consumer Random 
Effect 1.230165	 (0.07622) *** 1.22823 (0.070151) *** 
Product Random Effect 1.6026	 (0.173297) *** 1.596447 (0.171799) *** 
DIC:  31273.9543     31241.0058     
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3.4.3 Other Variables 
The control variables also show interesting results. As the results are largely 
comparable, we base the discussion on the baseline models. The curvilinear baseline hazard 
suggests that an average consumers’ likelihood to redeem a product first increases then 
decreases along the holding duration of coupons on that product (T: 0.135775 (0.037037); 
T_2: -0.214405 (0.008747)). This finding is expected as consumers’ interest and motivation 
rises at first but can fade away later as impatience grows. We use product-likes, past general 
redemption experience and past category-specific redemption experience to capture 
consumers’ coupon proneness. The results of these variables largely confirm the effect of 
coupon proneness on redemption likelihood. Though the effect of general redemption 
experience is insignificant, product-likes and category-specific redemption experience show 
positive and significant results (Likes: 0.387943 (0.042042); PastCR: 0.040464 (0.020458). 
We also use consumers’ past redemption experience together with referral intensity, past 
successful trading experience to control self-selection. However, the results suggest that more 
involved consumers may not necessarily be more likely to redeem products. We find that 
homophily positively influence coupon redemption likelihood. Consumers may tend to 
engage in trading activities with others who have relatively similar active level. The result 
suggests that such similarity among trading partners positively affects their redemption 
probability (AvgH: 1.748645 (0.159069)). Additional trading activities on coupons of other 
products do not seem to pose heavy mental burden on consumers. On the contrary, there 
seems to be a positive spillover effect as trading activities on coupons of other products 
actually increase the redemption likelihood of the focal product (OtherT: 0.000467 
(0.000137)), presumably due to the fact that the digitalized clipping and trading system of 
coupons eases consumers’ routine tasks on managing their coupon. Those who have stayed 
on the platform for longer time do not necessarily have a higher (or lower) propensity to 
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redeem, as Tenure is insignificant. Consumers who were invited to the platform are less 
motivated as their redemption likelihood is lower (Invite: -0.117162 (0.050896)). As we 
introduced in earlier sections, the randomly issued coupons upon daily login serve as a proxy 
of FSI. Compared to the social exposure effect of coupon trading, the results indicate that 1) 
the social exposure effect of coupon trading induced by consumers themselves indeed further 
increases product redemption likelihood aside from the exposure to FSI; 2) however, the 
social exposure effect of coupon trading is not as strong in magnitude as the effect of the 
exposure to FSI (Issue: 0.065601 (0.012191)). Similar to findings of previous literature, our 
results also suggest that product discount, rather than product price, is a more critical factor 
that influences consumer coupon redemption behavior (Luo, Andrews, Song, & Aspara, 
2014). Product price is insignificant while the discount shows positive and significant result 
(Discount: 14.440729 (0.152794)). Intuitively, this finding is in line with the common sense 
that consumers are motivated to use coupons due to the discount they receive rather than the 
price of the product itself. A higher price signals that an average consumer may have to spend 
more on the product while a higher discount signals more monetary savings. Time to 
expiration negatively affects redemption rate, indicating that consumers are patient enough to 
wait until the last moment to make their decision whether to redeem coupons hoping for 
collecting larger discount before the expiration (Expire: -0.786584 (0.0398)). Products that 
have longer redemption duration have a higher chance to be redeemed (RedDur: 0.304391 
(0.084334)). Advertising lifts product redemption probability (Ad: 0.000781 (0.000163)). 
Product abundance is positively associated with consumers’ coupon redemption likelihood 
(NumProduct: 0.01638 (0.002659)). From the results, electronic products (2.68306 
(0.387942)), fashion products (0.913535 (0.313401) and food products (0.884439 (0.32909)) 
appear to be more popular than the rest of product categories. Among these product 
		 63 
categories, electronic products are evidently the most attractive. The quarter dummies (Q1, 
Q2 and Q3) indicate seasonal fluctuation in consumers’ product redemption likelihood. 
3.4.4 Additional Assumption Test & Robust Checks 
We further ensure the robustness of the analysis by testing the proportionality 
assumption and by using different operationalization of the social exposure effect of coupon 
trading. Specifically, we test the assumption of proportionality in accordance of Singer & 
Willett (2003) by introducing interaction terms between the substantive variable (i.e., 
UW_Expo) and the baseline hazard function (T, T_2) in Model 3. The result is presented in 
Table 3.3 
 The main effect of the social exposure effect of coupon trading remains positive and 
significant (UW_Expo: 0.010906 (0.001481)). Its interaction with the baseline hazard 
suggests that the baseline hazard varies with different levels of exposure. Hence, the hazard is 
non-proportional. The interaction also indicate that the social exposure effect of coupon 
trading is magnified at first, but later fading away with time (T×UW_Expo: 0.006132 
(0.001031), T_2×UW_Expo: -0.001568 (0.000445)). We would like to note that the time 
varying effect does not compromise in any way our earlier conclusion on the social exposure 
effect of coupon trading. Variables’ primary effects are properly assessed only when no 
interaction terms involving them are included in the model (Aiken & West, 1991).  
In the second robust check, we operationalize the social exposure effect of coupon 
trading in two additional ways different from the one used in the main analysis. In the first 
operationalization, we measure the social exposure effect of coupon trading as the round-
weighted cumulative number of trade requests received (W_Expo). Since the trading process 
is composed of offers and counter offers, one trade can include multiple rounds. Consumers 
with low involvement in trading activities may lack motivation to process the product related 
information to which they are exposed, thus rendering the social exposure effect of coupon 
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trading less effective (Leclerc & Little, 1997). The more rounds (alternative offerings 
between the trading partners) in a trade, the more involved the consumers are in that trade. 
Table 3.3 Results of the non proportionality test   
  Model 3     
Intercept -11.601924 (0.27825) *** 
T 0.053369 (0.038981) 
 
T_2 -0.194574 (0.010796) *** 
UW_Expo 0.010906 (0.001481) *** 
TxUW_Expo 0.006132 (0.001031) *** 
T_2xUW_Expo -0.001568 (0.000445) *** 
Likes 0.388259 (0.042518) *** 
PastR 0.009767 (0.010617) 
 
PastCR 0.038654 (0.020538) * 
PastST 0.000293 (0.000233) 
 
AvgH 1.73134 (0.160669) *** 
OtherT 0.0006 (0.000136) *** 
Issue 0.066182 (0.012187) *** 
Tenure -0.009754 (0.012779) 
 
Invite -0.118202 (0.052364) ** 
Refer 0.005898 (0.005527) 
 
Price -0.000053 (0.000061) 
 
RedDur 0.298716 (0.082601) *** 
Expire -0.804758 (0.040048) *** 
Discount 14.497441 (0.155984) *** 
Ad 0.000787 (0.000165) *** 
Vol 0.000014 (0.00001) 
 
NumProduct 0.017268 (0.002656) *** 
Auto 0.996526 (0.664596) 
 
Beauty 0.170172 (0.46113) 
 
Electro 2.642186 (0.378784) *** 
Fashion 0.894591 (0.303016) *** 
Food 0.87135 (0.323049) *** 
Fun 0.415757 (0.340089) 
 
Home 0.231869 (0.312802) 
 
Q1 1.09691 (0.186771) *** 
Q2 -0.233096 (0.124318) * 
Q3 -0.273738 (0.075648) *** 
Consumer Random 
Effect 1.247409 (0.077177) *** 
Product Random Effect 1.605405 (0.174129) *** 
DIC:  31229.2673     
*, ** and *** indicate the significance levels are at 10%, 5% and 1% 
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With this operationalization (Model 4), we intend to exam whether the positive relationship 
between coupon trading and coupon redemption (due to the exposure towards product related 
information induced by consumers themselves) are affected by consumers’ involvement level 
in trades. 
In the second operationalization, we separate the social exposure effect of coupon 
trading into two parts. Previous studies on the exposure effect in coupon practice have 
unanimously modeled the exposure effect within the context that consumers actually receive 
the coupons. However, mere exposure effect can take place when the stimuli are just 
accessible to individuals’ perception (Zajonc, 1968). In coupon trading, some coupons 
actually exchanged while others are offered during trades but eventually not exchanged due 
to the failure to reach mutual agreement or the change of offers during the trades. Hence, 
grounded in the mere exposure effect theory, we use the cumulative number of coupons on a 
focal product that are actually received by the focal user in trading (R_Expo) as the first part 
of the social exposure effect of coupon trading, which is in line with previous coupon 
literature on exposure effect. Moreover, we use the cumulative number of coupons on a focal 
product that have been offered to but eventually not received by the focal consumer 
(NR_Expo) as the second part of the social exposure effect of coupon trading. Therefore, in 
Model 5, we intend to test whether coupon trading positively affects coupon redemption even 
without the actual receipt of coupons. The results of Model 4-5 are presented in Table 3.4. 
 The two alternative operationalizations of the social exposure effect of coupon trading 
both show positive and significant results (W_Expo:	0.004018 (0.000666); R_Expo: 0.016528 
(0.003386), NR_Expo: 0.007342 (0.001098)). The result suggests that our finding of the 
positive effect of coupon trading on coupon redemption due to the consumer-induced 
exposure towards product related information is consistent across different 
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operationalizations. In addition, it also suggests that such effect can sustain even without the 
actual receipt of coupons, indicating that mere visual stimulus also works.  
Table 3.4 Results of the different operationalization of the exposure effect 
  Model 4     Model 5     
Intercept -11.515741 (0.278665) *** -11.594684 (0.279397) *** 
T 0.137907 (0.036757) *** 0.131107 (0.036716) *** 
T_2 -0.214414 (0.008757) *** -0.213205 (0.008754) *** 
W_Expo 0.004018 (0.000666) *** 
   R_Expo 
   
0.016528 (0.003386) *** 
NR_Expo 
   
0.007342 (0.001098) *** 
Likes 0.398882 (0.041445) *** 0.389339 (0.041537) *** 
PastR 0.009473 (0.010567) 
 
0.010187 (0.010502) 
 
PastCR 0.04085 (0.020518) ** 0.037496 (0.020442) * 
PastST 0.00035 (0.000231) 
 
0.000304 (0.000233) 
 
AvgH 1.746848 (0.161649) *** 1.747424 (0.163088) *** 
OtherT 0.000448 (0.000136) *** 0.000406 (0.000137) *** 
Issue 0.065005 (0.012081) *** 0.068031 (0.012403) *** 
Tenure -0.011853 (0.012746) 
 
-0.010016 (0.012824) 
 
Invite -0.118668 (0.051236) ** -0.112449 (0.051646) ** 
Refer 0.005455 (0.005507) 
 
0.005578 (0.005598) 
 
Price -0.000055 (0.000062) 
 
-0.000046 (0.000062) 
 
RedDur 0.293333 (0.082718) *** 0.282772 (0.08326) *** 
Expire -0.781765 (0.039886) *** -0.784736 (0.039089) *** 
Discount 14.42207 (0.14678) *** 14.330212 (0.146452) *** 
Ad 0.000793 (0.000165) *** 0.000804 (0.000165) *** 
Vol 0.000009 (0.00001) 
 
0.000008 (0.00001) 
 
NumProduct 0.016351 (0.002662) *** 0.016532 (0.002692) *** 
Auto 1.101743 (0.6838) 
 
1.140393 (0.672537) * 
Beauty 0.228539 (0.457325) 
 
0.262205 (0.468824) 
 
Electro 2.669072 (0.372786) *** 2.688276 (0.373438) *** 
Fashion 0.929861 (0.295993) *** 0.937092 (0.3123) *** 
Food 0.879592 (0.332619) *** 0.888411 (0.326876) *** 
Fun 0.43856 (0.331004) 
 
0.454282 (0.342571) 
 
Home 0.244444 (0.310845) 
 
0.261114 (0.312166) 
 
Q1 1.088831 (0.190316) *** 1.098064 (0.189133) *** 
Q2 -0.275761 (0.126045) ** -0.262599 (0.125836) ** 
Q3 -0.275409 (0.076337) *** -0.271641 (0.076575) *** 
Consumer Random 
Effect 1.217048 (0.072276) *** 1.245912 (0.0722) *** 
Product Random Effect 1.592132 (0.172842) *** 1.61454 (0.173683) *** 
DIC:  31284.339     31223.5423     
*, ** and *** indicate the significance levels are at 10%, 5% and 1% 
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3.5 Implication & Conclusion 
At first glance, coupon trading seems a rather new phenomenon born under the 
background of the digital era. In fact, however, it has existed for quite a while in a rather 
undistinguished way. Coupon exchange clubs and coupon corners in online forums are 
traditionally the places where coupon trading takes place. Nonetheless, such scattered 
occurrences in real life practice provide us with very limited opportunities to research on 
topics related to coupon trading. Coupon trading can be an important way to improve coupon 
redemption probability. Not only does it facilitate consumer collecting and accumulating 
monetary savings, but also repeatedly expose consumers towards product related information, 
which can subsequently increase the likelihood of coupon redemption. More importantly, 
such effect is induced among consumers themselves rather than forced by coupon service 
providers. With a unique dataset of 32,603 consumers and 265 products from an online third-
party coupon service provider, this study is the first empirical work aiming to quantify the 
social exposure effect of coupon trading. Through a cross-classified discrete time event 
history analysis, our results confirm that coupon trading can increase coupon redemption 
likelihood due to the consumer-induced exposure towards product related information. 
Together with other variables included in our empirical models, this study provides important 
implications to the academia and the industry. 
3.5.1 Implication for Theory 
In this paper, we extend existing coupon literature by empirically investigating the 
social exposure effect of coupon trading on coupon redemption within the context of digital 
coupons and coupon service providers. With the development of digital technology, digital 
coupons are prospering and trading coupons are thus becoming more convenient and 
common. However, there is very little research on the effect of coupon trading. Therefore, 
our finding of the positive effect of coupon trading on coupon redemption due to consumer-
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induced exposure towards product related information implies new research areas and topics 
in coupon studies.  
Previous studies have shown that by including advertisement in coupons or 
customizing coupons by coupon manufacturers or retailers can positively influence 
consumers’ purchasing behavior (Bawa & Shoemaker, 1989) (Srinivasan, Leone, & Mulhern, 
1995) (Leclerc & Little, 1997) (Venkatesan & Farris, 2012). In this paper, we show that 
coupon trading can also be a channel to induce exposure towards product related information, 
and that consumer themselves function as the source of the exposure. This study suggests that 
apart from initiations directed by coupon manufacturers and retailers, other forms and sources 
of the exposure towards product related information shall be considered and explored in 
future coupon studies.  
Our result also suggests that the social exposure effect of coupon trading does not 
grow linearly and exhibits a diminishing pattern with respect to both the amount of exposure 
and the duration of time. This finding further bridges the mere exposure effect literature and 
the coupon literature in the sense that future coupon research related to exposure effect shall 
not limit itself to the linear operationalization and shall consider potential time varying effect.  
We also extend the coupon literature by studying market participant beyond the usual 
scope of coupon manufacturers or retailers. Focusing on a new but important player in 
modern coupon practice, namely online third-party coupon service providers, which emerge 
in the market due to the increasing popularity of digital coupons and rely heavily on coupon 
redemption rate in their business models, our work shows rich research opportunities on these 
coupon platforms and echoes previous researches’ call for more studies on coupon 
redemption rate (Musalem, Bradlow, & Raju, 2008).  
 Besides our main findings on the social exposure effect of coupon trading, we also 
confirm findings in pervious literature that monetary savings instead of price motivates 
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consumer to redeem products (Luo, Andrews, Song, & Aspara, 2014). Moreover, compared 
to the majority of existing coupon literature, we not only build our model on a disaggregated 
consumer-product level, but also consider unobserved heterogeneity in both consumers and 
products. Ignoring the unobserved heterogeneity on either of the two levels can lead to biased 
standard errors. Within the multilevel modeling framework, we extend prior studies on 
coupons by taking the cross-classified data structure of our sample into consideration. The 
significant consumer and product heterogeneity shows the feasibility and necessity to 
consider both product and consumer heterogeneity in coupon studies. 
3.5.2 Implication for Practice 
Our work also provides business implications for coupon service providers. The fact 
that digital coupons, which become more and more widely adopted as a marketing tool, 
suffer from low redemption rate makes our work highly relevant. Our result suggests that 
coupon service providers need to keep offering attractive products and discounts on the 
platform to increase redemption rate. Besides these measures, we also suggest that coupon 
platforms facilitate interactions among consumers and make consumers aware of the 
possibility to trade coupons. This is especially important as our results on the baseline hazard 
show that the redemption likelihood drops if coupons are held for too long. With coupon 
trading, consumers may collect discount faster and thus shorten the holding period. More 
importantly, coupon trading can increase the redemption likelihood and compensate the drop 
in redemption likelihood in the long term due to consumer-induced exposure towards product 
related information. Such social exposure effect is robust and consistent since different 
operationalization all report positive and significant results. This finding provides very useful 
implications to coupon service providers in the sense that coupon trading makes consumers 
more likely to pay for redemption and shortens the time it takes before consumers pay for 
redemption. Coupon service providers can thus collect revenue and cover their cost more 
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effectively and more quickly, which are crucial factors to sustain in the market. When coupon 
trading is facilitated, every consumer can function as a potential source of advertisement of 
products through exposing trading partners to product related information. Although our 
result suggests that the effect size of exposure from the service provider’s issued coupons is 
higher than that from the coupon trading, the total consumer generated exposure effect can 
easily surpass the amount produced by the service provider given a large consumer base. 
Hence, such ‘voluntary advertising’ among consumers can efficiently promote products and 
improve redemption rates. 
 On the other hand, some caution needs to be taken when implementing coupon 
trading. The result of the social exposure effect of coupon trading on coupon redemption is 
robust and consistent. However, we find that the positive effect can diminish if certain 
threshold is crossed. Coupon service providers may need to adjust consumers’ receipt of 
trade requests from time to time in order to avoid the satiation in the social exposure effect of 
coupon trading. This can also avoid consumers perceiving an overwhelming number of 
trading requests as some kind of spam. In addition, the positive effect of coupon trading on 
coupon redemption due to consumer-induced exposure towards product related information 
appears to diminish in the long term. To keep a high level of effect, fresh stimuli of such 
social exposure is necessary. This requires coupon service providers to find the subtle 
balance between too much coupon trading and not enough coupon trading. Of course, to 
enjoy the social exposure effect of coupon trading, managers and marketers will first have to 
incur cost on building and maintaining trading mechanisms. The cost may include 
establishing dedicated cyber space and the continuous expansion and maintenance of servers. 
In some cases, such expense can be non-negligible. One eclectic way to approach such 
concern would be to organize coupon trading periodically as special events instead of a 
regular routine. Nevertheless, with the development of information technology, we are sure to 
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witness a further decrease in hardware cost and a continuous increase in cost efficiency of 
equipment required for establishing coupon trading. We believe that regular coupon trading 
can be a viable and useful tool to improve online coupon service providers’ business models. 
3.5.3 Limitation 
Although our paper offers important contribution to the existing literature, it also has 
some limitations. Though we have comprehensive consumers’ behaviors, their 
socioeconomic information is not available to us. Such information would certainly extend 
our work. Besides, conversation logs during coupon trading can be very valuable to further 
improve our work. Combining empirical analysis with methods such as text mining can 
explore new research opportunities on coupon trading. In addition, we admit that our work 
might be finer grinded by building the model on shorter time intervals such as weeks or days 
given faster computational speed and higher memory capacity. For future research, 
replications with a finer time grid can be conducted to compare the results and to offer 
additional insight on related topics for both the academia and the industry.  
3.5.4 Conclusion 
In conclusion, coupon trading is a plausible business practice. The social exposure 
effect of coupon trading can increase coupon redemption probability. And most importantly, 
such effect is induced among consumers themselves rather than pushed by the service 
providers. We hope our work provides the academia and the industry with fresh insights on 
the coupon practice. We wish our work would encourage further research effort on coupon 
trading and related topics. 
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4 Two Sides of the Same Coin: The Effect of Virtual Currency on User 
Behavior 
 
Abstract 
Virtual currency has now been widely adopted across online platforms to facilitate 
platform users’ behaviors, to enhance their on-platform experience and to incentivize 
engagement. In this paper, we measure the effect of virtual currency on platform users’ 
behaviors. We build this work on the self-sufficiency theory in the literature stream of money 
psychology. We apply our analysis on a longitudinal dataset from a Swiss online social 
gaming/shopping platform over a time span of 47 weeks. Our results suggest that virtual 
currency enhances platform users’ individual behaviors, but lowers interaction among them. 
This study extends existing money psychology literature to virtual currency, offering 
important implication to researchers and practitioners. 
 
Keywords: virtual currency, money, money psychology, self-sufficiency, fixed effects, 
Poisson regression 
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4.1 Introduction 
For many people, they live two lives, one offline and another online. An 
indispensable part of the offline life for most of us is money. We use money to measure the 
values of various objects and services; we use money to pay for them; and we use money to 
store the value of assets for precaution. In recent years, we have witnessed the momentum in 
the shift of the emphasis from the offline world to the online world. The innovation in IT 
brings the experience of the offline life and that of the online life closer than ever. To 
facilitate people’s experience in the online environment and lift platform users’ engagement, 
virtual currency was introduced and popularized among online platforms over the past few 
years (Castronova, 2014). For example, on platforms such as the World of Warcraft, Amazon 
and QQ, virtual currency is introduced to make trades and purchases more convenient and to 
provide liquidity in the markets among their users in hope for an increased user involvement.  
Virtual currency fulfills similar functions that money does in real world. It closely 
resembles money and plausibly acts as money under many circumstances though it may not 
function as well as money in certain aspects (Castronova, 2014). The belief that virtual 
currency can alter people’s behaviors may be rooted in the power of money. Money is 
thought to be a driving force in people’s behaviors. Recent research on money suggests that 
money has the power to motivate human beings due to its instrumentality (Lea & Webley, 
2006). This is because that Money brings people a state of self-sufficiency, which induces 
people to exert more effort in personal goal attaining (Vohs, Mead, & Goode, 2006). 
However, while leading to a higher effort level in human beings’ behavior, the self-
sufficiency induced by money can also lead to estrangement at the same time (Vohs, Mead, 
& Goode, 2006). The desire for independence, personal control and autonomy resulted from 
self-sufficiency leads a preference less reliance and involvement among people, thus creating 
a longer interpersonal distance. Therefore, the question remains unanswered is whether 
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virtual currency, as a close resemblance to money, properly incentivizes people. Or does it 
alienate people just as money also does? Virtual currency has now been widely adopted 
across online platforms to facilitate users’ behaviors, to enhance their on-platform experience 
and to incentivize engagement. Unlike the time when “virtual currency” was still a buzzword, 
nowadays people are already used to it as a matter of course. Hence, given the fact that 
virtual currency has almost become a standard and indispensable part in the online 
environment, it is of vital importance to examine the effect it has on people’s behaviors. Yet, 
empirical research on the effect of virtual currency is scarce, if not non-existing. In this study, 
we examine the effect of virtual currency on platform users’ behaviors based on theories of 
money and money psychology. By doing so, we provide critical insights to marketers, 
platform operators and Internet practitioners. Today’s online platforms value their users’ 
engagement and the interaction among platform them more than anytime in the history 
because platforms’ business models and financial successes are often built on that. Thus 
understanding the effect of virtual currency on user behaviors and user interactions can 
greatly improve platforms’ operations and help them use virtual currency more wisely and 
less blindly. 
Our empirical analyses are based on a longitudinal dataset from a Swiss online social 
gaming/shopping platform. Unlike most online platforms or games, virtual currency was not 
implemented as a basic element when this platform started its operation. The platform 
launched its own virtual currency about one year and half later. This unique feature is critical 
for our analyses because it offers us with the opportunity to investigate how users’ behaviors 
are altered by virtual currency. Our longitudinal dataset consists of 16,962 platform users 
over a length of 47 weeks in 2013. Methodologically, we employ fixed effects Poisson (FEP) 
estimator (Wooldridge, 1999) to infer robust results (random effects models are also 
estimated for reference). We find that virtual currency does incentivize users’ individual 
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behaviors. But at the same time, we also find evidence that virtual currency diminishes 
communal motivations. Overall, our findings suggest that virtual currency, similar to money, 
encourages individualism and diminishes dependency and reliance, which can lead to a “play 
alone, work alone” mentality.  
Our work has theoretical and practical relevance because it offers important 
contribution to both the academia and the industry. We extend previous literature on money 
psychology to the context of virtual currency. Such extension is very important for the 
relatively under-researched topic of virtual currency against the background of the high 
penetration of virtual currency in our lives. It also makes a critical contribution in bridging 
researches on money and researches on virtual currency given the ever-blurring boundary of 
the online and the offline world. We offer vital implications for practitioners on the usage of 
virtual currency. Though individual behaviors can be boosted by virtual currency, online 
platforms shall also keep an eye on its effect on the deteriorating interaction among platform 
users. Our results suggest that practitioners shall not over-optimistically believe in the 
incentivizing power of virtual currency. They need to carefully evaluate the negative effect of 
virtual currency on the interaction among platform users and take proper measures to 
compensate such side effect.  
This paper is organized as follows: in the next section, we discuss the related 
literatures and the theoretical framework. Introduction on the dataset, the modeling strategy 
then follows. We present the results on the analyses and conclude the paper with implications. 
 
4.2 Related Literatures and Theoretical Framework 
To investigate virtual currency’s effect on platform users’ behaviors, we build our 
theoretical foundation of this study mainly on the literature of money psychology. As we 
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argued earlier, virtual currency plausibly functions as money in cyber space. Thus, it is 
natural to extend theories on money to virtual currency. 
4.2.1 Money and Money Psychology 
This study is mainly grounded in the recent research development of money 
psychology. We borrow theories on money due to the similarity between virtual currency and 
money. Money is the set of assets in an economy that people regularly use to buy goods and 
services from other people (Mankiw, 2014). Money in any economy serves three functions: it 
is a medium of exchange, a unit of account and a store of value (Mishkin, 2007): 
• Medium of exchange: as a medium of exchange, money, usually in the form of 
currency or checks, is used to pay for goods and services. The use of money as a 
medium of exchange promotes economic efficiency by minimizing the time spent in 
exchanging goods and services.  
• Unit of account: as a unit of account, money is used to measure value in the economy. 
The use of money as a unit of account reduces transaction costs in an economy by 
reducing the number of prices that need to be considered. The benefit of such function 
grows as the economy becomes more complex.  
• Store of value: as a store of value, money functions as a repository of purchasing 
power over time. Although many other assets have advantages over money as a store 
of value, money remains the most liquid asset among all in the sense that it is the 
easiest and fastest assets that can be converted into a medium of exchange since 
money itself is a medium of exchange.  
Most money exists in the form of fiat money today compared to commodity money or 
commodity-backed money. While commodity money such as gold carry intrinsic value in 
itself, commodity-backed money and fiat money are not intrinsically valuable. The 
commodity-backed money is acknowledged as an item represents the underlying commodity. 
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The fiat money is established as a currency decreed by governments as legal tender. Both 
forms haven been universally accepted along human history. For commodity money, it was 
accepted due to its intrinsic value. And for fiat money, it was accepted based on the decree 
from government that the currency is a legal tender to pay any debts. 
Money has been predominantly studied in a systematic way within the discipline of 
economics. For economists, such as Keynes, people demand money due to three motives, 
namely the transactions motive, the precautionary motive and the speculative motive (Keynes, 
2006). This is rooted in the functions that money serves. As a medium of exchange, a unit of 
account and a store of value, people can use money to make purchases, to store wealth and to 
prepare for unexpected emergencies. However, recent development in other disciplines 
greatly enriched our understanding on money from different angles. In psychology for 
example, Lea and Webley developed two complimentary theories to argue how can money 
act as incentive and reinforcer (Lea & Webley, 2006). It was postulated that money 
incentivize and motivates people by functioning as a tool and as a drug. Being a tool of 
exchange, money provides strong incentive due to the goods and services it can buy. Being a 
drug, money intrudes on the normal functioning of the nervous system. While money’s 
function as a tool has been well valued across human beings’ history, its function on humans’ 
nervous system were not well documented until recent research efforts in neurology. A 
special basal forebrain region was found to be the key node in translating money into 
motivational forces (Pessiglione, et al., 2007). However, as the old saying goes, every coin 
has two sides. That is all too accurate on money, literally or metaphorically. Vohs et al. (2006) 
proposed the self-sufficiency theory as an encapsulation of the work by Lea & Webley (2006) 
to further extend the explanation for the power of money. The self-sufficiency theory 
suggests that due to the instrumentality of money, it enables people to get things done 
independently rather than relying on others, thus inducing people entering a state of self-
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sufficiency. People under such state enjoy the feeling of personal control, autonomy and 
security because money to a large extent frees them from interdependence relationship. They 
believe that they can solve tasks without relying on others, thus exerting more efforts to 
achieve better personal performance. The lack of money on the contrary makes people feel 
ineffectual because they will be more heavily interdependent on social relationship, which 
explains why people craving for money. However, such emphasis on behaviors of one’s own 
choosing without active involvement from others leads to diminishing dependency among 
people. They desire to be free from dependency and also prefer that others not depend on 
them. This creates a greater physical distance among people and builds the ‘play alone, work 
alone’ mentality.  
4.2.2 Comparison between Money and Virtual Currency 
Over the past decade, we have witnessed the growing popularity among social media 
such as games, services and businesses to introduce their own virtual currency. According to 
the definition proposed by the European Central Bank, a virtual currency is a type of 
unregulated, digital money, which is issued and usually controlled by its developers, used and 
accepted among the members of a specific virtual community (European Central Bank, 2012).  
 Virtual currency is launched in games and various social media platforms to motivate 
users to be more engaged (Castronova, 2014). Such practice is largely rooted in traditional 
economic understandings on money motive. However, whether virtual currency can fulfill 
this purpose remains unknown and has not be empirically tested. But more importantly, no 
research has ever examined virtual currency’s effect on user interaction. If money creates 
larger distance among people, it is perfectly natural to speculate that virtual currency may 
very well be capable to do the same on online platform users. Since today’s social media 
platforms dependents heavily on user interaction, such effect would be devastating. Therefore, 
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it is imperative to investigate the effect of virtual currency. In order to do that, we inevitably 
have to compare virtual currency and money in the first place. 
 Virtual currency resembles money in that it fulfills similar functions in the virtual 
world as money does in the real world. However, due to the fact that virtual currency is not 
backed by legal entities, it may not be as effective as money in fulfilling certain function:  
• Medium of exchange: same as money, virtual currencies can be used to pay for either 
virtual or real goods and services in cyber spaces. It is even thought as a better means 
of exchange than money from a pure efficiency point of view because it can avoid 
impositions that curtail exchange (Castronova, 2014). 
• Unit of account: as a unit of account, virtual currency can be issued in fractions based 
on the numbering system of the platform. Since they can be applied on any numbering 
system, virtual currency is easily scalable. Thus, they can function perfectly as a unit 
of account. 
• Store of value: to function as a store of value, virtual currencies shall ideally either 
possess intrinsic values that are not easily eroded or be legally backed by the issuing 
legal body that will be in stable operation for long enough. However, neither does 
virtual currency carries any intrinsic value, nor do online platforms possess legislative 
authority to declare virtual currency’s legality. It therefore relies solely on platforms’ 
reputation and prospect to make virtual currency a proper store of values. Yet, online 
platforms are far less stable compared to modern governments. Obviously, virtual 
currency can be store of value to some extent (i.e., as long as the issuing platforms 
still prosper in business). But they will not be as effective as money to carry out this 
function. 
Though probably not being as effective as money in fulfilling all the basic functions as an 
instrument, virtual currency closely resembles money in the cyber world. The similarity 
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between virtual currency and money thus seems to favor the widely adopted practice of using 
virtual currency as a motivation driver in online environment. Nevertheless, due to the 
similarity to money, it is also plausible to speculate that the self-sufficiency induced by 
money may also be triggered by virtual currency. Specifically, virtual currency, like money, 
may alienate people from their peers. It can result in grieve consequence since most online 
platforms usually rely heavily on user interaction as the backbone of their business models. If 
this is the case, then virtual currency can be a double-edge sword for online platforms in the 
sense that it incentivizes only individualism but diminishes interaction. The combination of 
the potentially positive and negative effect of virtual currency on people’s behaviors leaves 
us with a big question mark on the validity of arbitrarily adopting virtual currency as an 
incentive scheme. This also underscores the importance of our study to both the academia 
and the industry. 
	
4.3 Empirical Analysis	
4.3.1 General Setting 
 This study collects data from a Swiss online social gaming and shopping platform 
founded at the end of 2011, which prefers to remain anonymous. The experience on the 
platform resembles an online Collecting/Trading Card Game (CCG/TCG). Users could 
collect cards, which stand for discount vouchers on various products, and could trade them 
with other users and accumulate discounts for product redemption. While product redemption 
and login were the most direct and intuitive measure of users’ engagement on the platform, 
their social interaction on the platform primarily lay in trading activities. The gamification of 
the experience on the platform (i.e., trading cards) differentiated the platform from its 
competitors and earned it its niche position in the market.  In a word, the platform depended 
primarily on users’ engagement and interaction to build up its reputation among suppliers and 
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to attract external investment. In early June 2013, the platform launched its own virtual 
currency. Platform users could use virtual currency to pay for additional discount on the 
products. Virtual currency could be collected through daily login as users were awarded with 
random cards including virtual currency upon daily login. They could also collect virtual 
currency by exchanging cards for virtual currency with others. Unlike most of the virtual 
currency schemes, which are usually implemented as part of the basic functions upon the 
launch of platforms, the platform in this study introduced its virtual currency when the 
operation was stable. Therefore, our data offers us with the unique opportunity to investigate 
the effect of virtual currency on platform users’ behaviors.  
Since our work is built upon theories related to money, we essentially assume that 
virtual currency resembles money. This is true in our case as the platform’s virtual currency, 
same as other virtual currency, fulfilled the three major functions of money to a large extent: 
medium of exchange, unit of account and store of value. Specifically, virtual currency served 
as a medium of exchange because it could be used in trades among platform users, be used to 
exchange for additional discount on a product, and be used to exchange for additional 
chances to draw random cards. Since its launch, the percentage discount on a product (i.e., 
one unique card stands for 10% discount on a product) was also enlisted in the form of virtual 
currency. Therefore, virtual currency also served as a unit of account on the product value. 
Virtual currency stored value to some extent since it was backed by the platform, which saw 
no danger of immediate collapse at the time of the launch. Thus, virtual currency on the 
platform was indeed similar to money. 
4.3.2 Data and Model 
We build our empirical analyses on a longitudinal dataset collected from late January 
2013 to late December 2013 over a total length of 47 weeks. The panel is unbalanced since 
different users joined the platform at different times. Users who had at least one login during 
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the whole period of study are selected to form the sample. Within the period of study, the 
platform recorded 16,962 platform users who logged in for at least once, 1,315,899 logins, 
711,256 trade proposals and 35,227 product redemptions. To test virtual currency’s effect on 
platform users’ behaviors, we examine three most important behaviors on the platform: 
product redemption, login and proposing trades. These three measures are chosen because 
they best fit the platform’s business model. Moreover, they are fairly direct and intuitive in 
reflecting users’ engagement and their interaction, thus inline with our target on testing the 
effect of virtual currency:  
• Weekly product redemptions (RediW): The ultimate goal of platform users is to 
redeem products. Virtual currency, a flexible payment method (for additional discount) 
as the result of its instrumentality of being a medium of exchange, shall increase 
platform users’ redemption incidences. Besides, if virtual currency induces self-
sufficiency, then users would exert more efforts in attaining personal goals, which 
would also lead to a higher number of product redemption incidences as a result.  
• Weekly login days (LogDiW): Login is a commonly recognized measures on 
engagement adopted by online games and various social media nowadays. Since 
virtual currency serves similar functions as money does, platform users would likely 
value it for its instrumentality, just as people demanding for money in real world. 
Virtual currency enabled them with autonomy in their activities on the platform, 
which would have been ineffectual if no virtual currency existed. Therefore, users 
would increase their login frequencies because that would give them a higher chance 
in obtaining more virtual currency. Login days rather than the number of logins are 
used because the random cards, which included virtual currency, were awarded to 
users upon daily login. In another word, users received random cards only upon their 
first login within a day. Multiple logins within a day did not necessarily increase the 
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chance to earn more virtual currency. Hence, the number of days in a week on which 
a platform user logged in is the more appropriate measure. 
• Weekly trade proposals (TrdPiW): Interaction among platform users are vital to the 
success of various online platforms. Nevertheless, the self-sufficiency theory suggests 
that money induces a preference of less dependency and less involvement from others. 
If this also applies to virtual currency, it can lead to a decrease in trade proposals 
conditional on logins (i.e., lower trade proposals rate). The reason for this is that 
though virtual currency could arguably facilitate trading as a medium of exchange, 
trading activities required extensive interaction among trading partners, which is less 
preferred if self-sufficiency is induced. For example, as channels to collect cards for 
discount, login and using virtual currency for additional chances to draw random 
cards empowered users with higher personal control and autonomy compared to 
trading, which required more reliance, dependency and mutual involvement. Similarly, 
in obtaining virtual currency, for the same logic, platform users would prefer higher 
login frequencies to trading. In addition, with the emergence of demand for virtual 
currency, arguably more platform users would require virtual currency in return 
during trading, which might cause difficulty in matching mutual needs. All of these 
would result a much more significant increase in login rather than that in trade 
proposals. Consequently, with the introduction of virtual currency, platform users 
might play more often, but only by themselves rather than with others. 
A simple graphic comparison of the three measures conditional on whether affected by 
virtual currency is shown in Figure 4.1-4.3. It is evident that the average weekly product 
redemptions and login days when users were exposed to virtual currency are obviously higher 
than those when users were not exposed to virtual currency. The drop if trade proposal rate is 
also evident from the graph.  
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Figure 4.1 Comparison of average weekly product redemptions conditional on whether 
exposed to virtual currency 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4.2 Comparison of average weekly login days conditional on whether exposed to 
virtual currency 
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Figure 4.3 Comparison of average weekly trade proposal rate conditional on whether exposed 
to virtual currency 	
4.3.3 Empirical Model   
 We use a dummy variable VC to capture the effect of virtual currency on platform 
user behaviors. It is operationalized as 1 since users’ first login after the launch of virtual 
currency and 0 before that. Note that in this setup, though the virtual currency was launched 
on a specific date, different users were potentially affected by it from different dates (or not 
exposed to it at all) (i.e., users started to be potentially influence by virtual currency only 
since their first login after the launch). As illustrated in Figure 4.4, though the event occurs at 
T=3, only user B was immediately exposed to virtual currency since he logged onto the 
platform in the same week after the launch. User A on the other hand was not immediately 
exposed to it since he had not yet logged in. User A’s first login after the launch is at T=6. 
Therefore, the dummy variable turns to 1 only since T=6. User C joined the platform at T=8. 
Thus, VC is recorded as 1 only since T=8. User D, an existing user same as user A and user B, 
had no login record after the virtual currency was launched. Hence, for user D, VC is 0.  
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A 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
B 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
C:        1 1 1 1 1 
D 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
T 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 
Figure 4.4 Operationalization of virtual currency dummy variable in the main analysis 
Given the nature of our dependent variable, which is non-negative discretely 
distributed, it is a natural choice to estimate our regression equations using count models. 
Specifically, we use Poisson regression to model platform user i’s product redemption 
behavior, login behavior and his trading behavior at time t and estimate the following models: 
Product redemptions: ? ICW.|"h|}"h, ~" = ~"C@A }"h Ä  
Login days: ? E01X.|"h|}"h, ~" = ~"C@A }"h Ä  
Trade proposal: ? 9%W$.|"h|}"h, ~" = ~"C@A }"h Ä + ln 9E01"h   
Where }"h is the vector of covariates: 
t, t2: the quadratic function of time capturing a general polynomial trend in users’ behaviors 
LastLog: recency of the focal platform user’s login (i.e., number of weeks since their last 
login) 
PastLogW: the focal platform user’s total past login weeks  
PastTrdP: the focal platform user’s total past trading activities (which includes both trades 
proposed and trades received)  
PastSucTrd: the focal platform user’s total past successful trades  
PastRed: the focal platform user’s total past product redemptions  
PastSpending: the focal platform user’s total past monetary spending  
NPrd: the focal platform user’s current holding of potentially redeemable products (i.e., 
number of product of which at least one card is in users’ possession)  
DPrd: the median of the percentage discount of the focal platform user’s potentially 
redeemable products  
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UPLike: the number of products liked by the focal platform user (the platform offered the 
function for users to indicate the product they liked) 
Advertising: Weekly advertising cost, controlling promotion and advertising effect 
NumPrd: weekly number of product available on the platform 
MedPrice: median product prices on the platform, controlling the general price level 
And ~" is the individual effects that enter the model multiplicatively. While the number of 
days in a week is the same for every user, the number of logins in a week varies across 
platform users. Therefore, we use the number of total logins in a week (TLog) of the focal 
user’s as the exposure variable in the trade model to model users’ trade proposals in a week 
conditional on the number of logins (i.e., trade proposals per login or trade proposal rate). 
The time trend variables, various platform and user variables over multiple 
observations along the study period, and together with the individual effect essentially model 
how users would have behaved if they were not exposed to the launch of virtual currency. 
The variable VC thus identifies the effect of virtual currency on platform users’ various 
behaviors. In Table 4.1, we report the summary statistics of the variables. Before proceeding 
to the estimation issues, we spend a few lines giving an overview of the summary statistics.  
Average consumers were not heavily addicted to the platform according to the login 
variable and the login recency variable. However, the consumer base seemed stable as the on 
average platform users visited the platform over 21 weeks. This is also suggested by their 
trading variables. Though on average individuals did not particularly trades on a frequent 
base, their cumulative trading records were relatively higher. Average successful trades 
suggest that the success rate was not particularly high. On average, it seems that platform 
users were not particularly fond of the products on the platform. They did not possess many 
potentially redeemable products. And they had relatively low discount on those potentially 
redeemable products. Their redemption incidence was very rare. Monetary spending by 
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platform users was not high either. The spending on advertising seemed sufficient and 
product availability was abundant. The general product price level on platform was moderate. 
The variables are grand mean centered whenever appropriate. 
Table 4.1 Summary statistics and definitions of variables 
Variable Mean Std. Dev. 
RediW 0.04894 0.63428 
LogDiW 1.19582 2.26790 
TrdPiW 0.98813 10.96842 
PastLogW 21.23969 21.33791 
LastLog 11.69991 12.40689 
PastTrd (in hundred) 2.73906 7.49613 
PastSucTrd (in hundred) 0	.42453 1.21650 
PastRed  2.39790 9.21249 
PastSpending (in hundred) 0.53439 2.43727 
NPrd 6.09715 10.01371 
DPrd (with 1 corresponding to 100% discount) 0.53240 0.64114 
UPLike 0.22073 0.86383 
Advertising (in thousand) 2.44930 2.40488 
NumPrd 56.14923 17.97417 
MedPrice (in hundred) 1.35158 0	.29767 
 
Since the outcome variables (i.e., users’ product redemptions, logins and trade 
proposals) are non-negative integers, linear regression can lead to significant deficiency due 
to the ignorance of the restricted support for the outcome variables (Cameron & Trivedi, 
2013). Standard Poisson regression assumes that the data is equidispersed. However, this 
assumption is rarely met in practice. In social science, data commonly exhibits 
overdispersion, which violates the underlying assumption of the standard Poisson regression. 
Such violation results in incorrect standard errors. Therefore, instead of standard Poisson 
regression, the fixed effects Poisson regression with robust standard errors is used. The 
resulting fixed effects Poisson (FEP) estimator is free from distribution assumptions and is 
fully robust to issues such as serial correlation (Wooldridge, 1999). Since the fixed effects 
estimator is generally more robust than the random effects estimator in Poisson regression, 
we base our interpretation on the results from the fixed effects models. However, we also 
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estimate the random effects models where the individual effect ~" is assumed to follow 
gamma distribution with mean one and variance É. The effect of virtual currency is largely 
coherent between the fixed effects models and the random effects models. The estimation is 
conducted in Stata 13. 
 
4.4 Results    
 In this section, we report the estimation results of the models. All estimation results 
are summarized in Table 4.2. AIC of the fixed effects models (product redemption model: 
134183.4, login model: 1060763, trade proposal model: 944586.2) compared to that of the 
pooled models (product redemption model: 164767.6, login model: 1195157, trade proposal 
rate model: 1029909) indicates that models with individual effects indeed perform better. It 
shall be noted that users who have only one observation or those whose outcome variables 
are always zero are left out when estimating the fixed effects models. The number of 
observations is also reported in Table 4.2. As we introduced earlier, users’ product 
redemption and trading were not particularly frequent on the platform. This explains the 
fairly large difference in the number of observations between the fixed effects models and 
random effect models. It is important to note that the reduced sample size in the fixed effects 
models is unrelated to truncation or selection. Those observations are properly dropped 
because they are uninformative for estimating the parameters in the fixed effects models. In 
addition, the observations in the trade proposal model are lower because only observations 
with weekly total logins more than zero are used for the estimation (the exposure variable has 
to be strictly positive). 
 
		 93 
Table 4.2 Results of the main analysis 
 Product Redemption Login Days Trade Proposal per Login 
 Fixed Effects Random Effects Fixed Effects Random Effects Fixed Effects Random Effects 
t 0.023212 (0.006875) *** -0.021380 (0.004077) *** -0.058309 (0.001472) *** -0.052372 (0.001074) *** -0.027285 (0.006047) *** -0.023935 (0.003719) *** 
t2 -0.002509 (0.000178) *** -0.002201 (0.000216) *** 0.000483 (0.000019) *** 0.000490 (0.000018) *** -0.000685 (0.000126) *** -0.000668 (0.000127) *** 
VC 0.464845 (0.069264) *** 0.581562 (0.089067) *** 0.408233 (0.009665) *** 0.413274 (0.009632) *** -0.320793 (0.052437) *** -0.321543 (0.051902) *** 
PastLogW -0.024126 (0.006949) *** 0.022346 (0.003780) *** 0.025909 (0.001574) *** 0.019887 (0.000982) *** 0.002819 (0.007069)  -0.000742 (0.004237)  
LastLog -0.053404 (0.013306) *** -0.091867 (0.048631) * -0.151236 (0.002928) *** -0.167188 (0.005251) *** 0.010699 (0.003595) *** 0.005420 (0.003867)  
PastTrd -0.002926 (0.009838)  0.014336 (0.013753)  -0.000495 (0.002197)  -0.001158 (0.002020)  -0.020133 (0.006417) *** -0.019142 (0.006316) *** 
PastSucTrd 0.017919 (0.048846)  -0.035747 (0.041977)  0.015342 (0.009779)  0.022687 (0.009907) ** 0.078462 (0.026408) *** 0.076215 (0.026489) *** 
PastRed -0.006461 (0.002598) ** -0.007855 (0.002857) *** -0.001765 (0.000627) *** -0.002109 (0.000675) *** 0.002027 (0.001706)  0.001789 (0.001749)  
PastSpending -0.068519 (0.025960) *** -0.026886 (0.022492)  0.005044 (0.003635)  0.002405 (0.003323)  -0.016483 (0.013127)  -0.014204 (0.012627)  
NPrd 0.042700 (0.003360) *** 0.042257 (0.003594) *** 0.031330 (0.000497) *** 0.032215 (0.000576) *** -0.003133 (0.001978)  -0.002979 (0.001970)  
DPrd 0.053752 (0.045146)  0.100282 (0.059227) * 0.013055 (0.005837) ** 0.016375 (0.005853) *** 0.182969 (0.026778) *** 0.185349 (0.026047) *** 
UPLike 0.071600 (0.018098) *** 0.083180 (0.024109) *** 0.034158 (0.003835) *** 0.035031 (0.003833) *** 0.041282 (0.019346) ** 0.041599 (0.019550) ** 
Advertising -0.014662 (0.009523)  -0.018682 (0.009725) * 0.008856 (0.000711) *** 0.009398 (0.000726) *** -0.002281 (0.005480)  -0.002281 (0.005510)  
NumPrd -0.012767 (0.001752) *** -0.013144 (0.001804) *** -0.003136 (0.000130) *** -0.003193 (0.000133) *** 0.005566 (0.000871) *** 0.005500 (0.000877) *** 
MedPrice -0.585866 (0.087986) *** -0.650551 (0.110402) *** -0.324347 (0.006651) *** -0.333555 (0.007076) *** -0.074324 (0.057605)  -0.073718 (0.057483)  
Intercept    -4.976660 (0.425545) ***    -2.294909 (0.042852) ***    -0.968395 (0.068993) *** 
alpha    7.662126 
(12.220760
)     0.936835 (0.339335)     3.376585 (2.608207)  
number of obs 122028   719798   719791   719798   168900   203491   
 
*, ** and *** indicate the significance levels are at 10%, 5% and 1% 
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For the product redemption model, the result shows that virtual currency indeed 
increased users’ redemption numbers (VC:  0.464845 (0.069264)). This suggests that virtual 
currency, as an incentivizing force and as an instrument of payment, facilitated platform users 
in attaining their goal of product redemption. With the launch of virtual currency, their 
redemption incidents increased by more than 46% on average. For the login equation, the 
result shows that virtual currency also increased platform users’ login frequencies (VC:  
0.4082326 (0.009665)). This suggests that the demand for virtual currency drives users to log 
onto the platform significantly more often. The number of days on which users logged in 
increased by more than 40% on average. As we have expected, virtual currency led to a drop 
in trade proposals by more than 32% (VC: -0.320793 (0.052437)) on average. This 
corroborates our speculation that virtual currency undermined interaction among users. The 
finding on the effect of virtual currency echo previous research on money and testifies that, 
same as money, virtual currency incentivizes users, but only in terms of individualism.  
 The other variables also show interesting findings. The time trend across the models 
indicates that user activities were dropping along the period of the time in general. The longer 
time since users’ previous login (LastLog), the less active users would become in product 
redemption and login. Users’ past login weeks (PastLogW) suggests that users who stayed 
longer on the platform would tend to login at a higher frequency. But they would have fewer 
product redemptions. This somehow passive behavior may be rooted in the fact that the 
engagement level of platform users was fading in general and the login behavior was a result 
of mere habit. Users who were involved in more trading activities in the past (PastTrd) would 
be less active in proposing trades presumably due to the fade in their interest in the gaming 
mechanism. However, successful trading experience (PastSucTrd) seemed to compensate the 
fading interest and increased users’ trade proposals. Users’ larger past product redemption 
amount (PastRed) would lower their product redemption and login frequency. This is 
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probably because that with the increase in the accumulated redemption incidents, users’ 
feeling of freshness and motivation diminished. Users’ past monetary spending 
(PastSpending) lowered their product redemption frequency. In most social shopping or 
gaming, people prefer to play or get things for free. Increasing spending would therefore limit 
their further active engagement. The variables on users past behaviors underscore the 
importance for online platforms to stimulates users’ interest and motivation, a point that we 
will discuss again in next section. Not surprisingly, with the increase in the potentially 
redeemable products users had (NPrd), the discount they enjoyed (DPrd) and the number of 
products liked (UPLike), users generally became more active.  
 As to the platform level variables, we find that advertising (Advertising) was 
positively associated with users’ login only. This indicates that advertising presumably can 
attract people to the platform, but not necessarily make them extra active on the platform. 
Increasing the numbers of products on the platform (NumPrd) seemed to correlate to lower 
product redemption. It is likely because that the increase in product numbers increased users’ 
mental burden in strategically collecting their vouchers, which reduced their redemption 
incidents. Users seem not to favor such expansion as their login frequency also dropped. The 
positive association between the number of product and users’ trade proposal rate is probably 
because users on average would have more resources to make trades with more products on 
the platform. The general price level (MedPrice) is negatively associated with users’ product 
redemptions and login frequency, indicating the business model should be based on bargains 
rather than expensive products.  
 
4.5 Robust check 
  In the main analysis we operationalize the variable of virtual currency in the way that 
the effect of virtual currency started since users’ first login after the launch of the virtual 
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currency. This is plausible as users were only affected by the virtual currency when they were 
exposed to the environment in which the virtual currency was implemented. That started 
since the first time when users logged on to the platform after the launch of the virtual 
currency. However, one can argue that some users might have learnt the launch from other 
channels and consequently decided to leave the platform for good before they experience the 
updated platform with virtual currency. We would like to state that this is fairly unlikely. 
Virtual currency has existed in games and social media platforms for decades. Indeed, as 
Castronova (2014) suggested, players would probably be surprised to find a virtual world 
without a virtual currency. Therefore, it is very difficult to imagine that on a social 
shopping/gaming platform, such as the one in this study, which resembles a TCG/CCG game, 
users would not log onto the platform for even once simply due to the launch of virtual 
currency. Yet, to ensure the robustness of this study, we conduct a robust check to further 
validate our results. The argument of users might have learnt the launch of virtual currency 
and accordingly decided to leave the platform implies that those users were also exposed to 
the virtual currency. Based on this logic, we push the limit of such logic even further and 
impose an assumption that every user in the sample was exposed to the virtual currency at the 
earliest possible time, which is the week of the launch. This operationalization is illustrated in 
Figure 4.5 with the event occurs at T=3. Only now, different from that in the main analysis, 
user B is not the only user who is immediately exposed to virtual currency. User A and user 
D are also exposed to virtual currency at T=3 as well because we assume that every one  
A 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
B 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
C:        1 1 1 1 1 
D 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
T 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 
Figure 4.5 Operationalization of virtual currency dummy variable in the robust check 
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learnt the event somehow from other channels. User C is still exposed at T=8 since that is the 
time he joins the platform. We would like to emphasize that this is a very strong assumption 
since it essentially assumes that within the same week of the launch, every user, even without 
logging onto the platform, learnt the event. The imposition of such a strong assumption may 
seem implausible since if users did not learn the event within the launching week, such 
operationalization would dilute the effect of virtual currency conditional on the general time 
trend and platform variables. This would essentially lead to the most conservative results on 
the effect of virtual currency. Therefore, for the sack of robustness, we shall only use the 
results of this extreme setup as a test on the lower bound of virtual currency’s effect. 
 The results of the robust check are shown in Table 4.3. We would like to note that the 
results on the effect of virtual currency under this setup are consistent in signs and 
significance compared to those in the main analysis. Since this robust check serves as a test 
on the lower bound of the effect of virtual currency, the coherent in the signs and significance 
again shows the evident effect of virtual currency on platform users’ behaviors. As expected, 
the outcome is indeed more conservation compared to the results from the main analysis. For 
the product redemption model, the effect of virtual currency on users’ product redemptions 
shrinks by about half (VC:  0.221995 (0.065682)). This suggests that virtual currency, under 
the assumption we made in the robust check, increased users’ redemption incidents by more 
than 22%. For the login equation, the shrinkage is even larger (VC:  0.135274 (0.007056)). 
This suggests that virtual currency, under the assumption we made in the robust check, 
increased users’ redemption incidents by more than 13%. Since the trade proposal model 
only includes observations where total logins in a week is strictly positive, the result from the 
robust check coincides with that from the main analysis (VC: -0.320793 (0.052437)), 
indicating a more than 32% drop in users’ trade proposals. A graphic comparison between the 
results from the main analysis and the robust check is presented in Figure 4.6. 
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Table 4.3 Results of the robust check 
 Product Redemption Login Days Trade Proposal per Login 
 Fixed Effects Random Effects Fixed Effects Random Effects Fixed Effects Random Effects 
t 0.033519 (0.007105) *** -0.008976 (0.004630) * -0.050003 (0.001519) *** -0.043483 (0.001128) *** -0.027285 (0.006047) *** -0.023935 0.003719 *** 
t2 -0.002778 (0.000178) *** -0.002586 (0.000191) *** 0.000302 (0.000018) *** 0.000306 (0.000017) *** -0.000685 (0.000126) *** -0.000668 0.000127 *** 
VC 0.221995 (0.065682) *** 0.229394 (0.065227) *** 0.135274 (0.007056) *** 0.135001 (0.007035) *** -0.320793 (0.052437) *** -0.321543 0.051902 *** 
PastLogW -0.025829 (0.007080) *** 0.022547 (0.003603) *** 0.026723 (0.001604) *** 0.020236 (0.001020) *** 0.002819 (0.007069)  -0.000742 0.004237  
LastLog -0.061262 (0.013282) *** -0.105761 (0.052507) ** -0.160203 (0.002916) *** -0.176624 (0.005273) *** 0.010699 (0.003595) *** 0.005420 0.003867  
PastTrd -0.002715 (0.009905)  0.014525 (0.013764)  0.000065 (0.002191)  -0.000724 (0.002020)  -0.020133 
(0.006417
) *** -0.019142 0.006316 *** 
PastSucTrd 0.017812 (0.048951)  -0.035847 (0.042223)  0.014036 (0.009736)  0.021669 (0.009894) ** 0.078462 
(0.026408
) *** 0.076215 0.026489 *** 
PastRed -0.006459 (0.002606) ** -0.007875 (0.002877) *** -0.001863 (0.000632) *** -0.002191 (0.000679) *** 0.002027 (0.001706)  0.001789 0.001749  
PastSpending -0.068327 (0.026009) *** -0.026964 (0.022430)  0.005167 (0.003604)  0.002488 (0.003299)  -0.016483 
(0.013127
)  -0.014204 0.012627  
NPrd 0.042449 (0.003362) *** 0.041818 (0.003583) *** 0.031336 (0.000498) *** 0.032246 (0.000581) *** -0.003133 (0.001978)  -0.002979 0.001970  
DPrd 0.054538 (0.045285)  0.101667 (0.059563) * 0.011172 (0.005777) * 0.014298 (0.005785) ** 0.182969 
(0.026778
) *** 0.185349 0.026047 *** 
UPLike 0.072187 (0.018200) *** 0.083946 (0.024277) *** 0.036134 (0.003951) *** 0.036994 (0.003949) *** 0.041282 (0.019346) ** 0.041599 0.019550 ** 
Advertising -0.005833 (0.009625)  -0.006634 (0.010282)  0.017894 (0.000669) *** 0.018606 (0.000697) *** -0.002281 
(0.005480
)  -0.002281 0.005510  
NumPrd -0.012115 (0.001729) *** -0.012216 (0.001763) *** -0.002016 (0.000126) *** -0.002048 (0.000128) *** 0.005566 (0.000871) *** 0.005500 0.000877 *** 
MedPrice -0.470118 (0.086386) *** -0.483999 (0.096065) *** -0.218858 (0.006574) *** -0.226112 (0.006854) *** -0.074324 (0.057605)  -0.073718 0.057483  
Intercept    -4.832548 (0.433520) ***    -2.183225 (0.043558) ***    -0.968395 0.068993 *** 
alpha    7.802984 (12.433560)     0.942529 (0.340867)     3.376585 (2.608207)  
number of obs 122028   719798   719791   719798   168900   203491   
 
*, ** and *** indicate the significance levels are at 10%, 5% and 1% 
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Figure 4.6 Comparison of the effect of virtual currency between the main analysis and the 
robust check 
 
4.6 Conclusions and Implication 
 In this paper, we investigate the effect of virtual currency on a unique dataset of 
16,962 users from a Swiss online social gaming/shopping platform. Through our empirical 
analyses using fixed effects Poisson regression, we find that virtual currency can indeed 
boost platform users’ behaviors. However, it lowers interaction among platform users at the 
same time. This suggests that the self-sufficiency induced by money also applies to virtual 
currency. The findings in this paper offer several important implications to both theories and 
practices. 
4.6.1 Implication for theory 
 The most important theoretical implication is that we extend money psychology to 
virtual currency. Though a popular phenomenon, the amount of research on virtual currency 
is limited compared to that on money. However, with the fast increasing in total value of 
virtual currency over the world, it deserves more research attention. Virtual currency has 
been argued as a close resemblance to money mainly due to its instrumentality. Our results 
suggest that in addition to the instrumentality, virtual currency seems to have similar effect 
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on platform users’ behaviors as money does on people. This has important implications 
because it brings virtual currency and money even closer. Since virtual currency is a 
relatively new phenomenon and lacks general theoretical framework, the closeness between 
virtual currency and money indicates promising researches opportunities in theory building 
related to virtual currency by utilizing the fruitful research outcomes on money. The bridging 
between the two can extend our current understanding on virtual currency and address 
unsolved issues. 
 The results of this work also provide implications to the literature of customer 
engagement, especially among virtual communities. Though widely used by practitioners, the 
concept of customer engagement did not draw much research attention in marketing literature 
except for some pioneering work (Algesheimer, Dholakia, & Hermann, 2005). Since that, 
however, we have witnessed significant development in this stream of literature (Marketing 
Science Institue, 2010). Due to the prevalence of virtual world in our lives, specific research 
attention has been paid on customer engagement in virtual communities (Brodie, Ilic, Juric, 
& Hollebeek, 2013). However, as an important part of virtual world, virtual currency’s 
potential effect on engagement has been overlooked. From the results of this study, we see 
the opportunity for new addition and extension to the customer engagement literature. 
According to Vivek, Beatty, and Morgan (2012) customer engagement refers to the intensity 
of an individual’s participation and connection with the organization's offerings and activities 
initiated by either the customer or the organization. And users’ interactive experience has 
been argued as an important aspect of customer engagement (Van Doorn, et al., 2010). The 
results of this study suggest that while virtual currency can indeed encourage users to 
increase the intensity of individual participation on platforms, it also limits users’ interactive 
experiences. Therefore, the effect of virtual currency on engagement is significant but mixed, 
potentially an addition and extension to Hennig-Thurau et al.’s (2004) eight-factor theory on 
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what motives engagement with online communities. There has been very limited research on 
the effect of virtual currencies on user engagement (Wang & Mainwaring, 2010). And no 
empirical analysis on this topic has been recorded in the existing literature. Hence, our work 
broadens the customer engagement literature by showing the necessity to incorporate virtual 
currencies in this stream of literature. 
4.6.2 Implication for practice 
 Our findings are also relevant for online platforms and communities. User life cycle 
on social gaming and retailing platform are rather short. According the report from Flurry, 
the 90-day retention rate of social games and retailing apps were just 29% and 33% 
(FLURRY, 2012). The results of our analyses also find similar phenomenon in the sense that 
users inevitably become less and less active due to the fade in their motivation and the feeling 
of freshness. As a result, new contents or services have to been carried out on a frequent base 
to satisfy users’ needs and to keep them interested. However, such strategy may not always 
work. First, it will require platform operators to push forward new contents with acceptable 
quality on a frequent base, which simply may not be possible due to resource limitations. 
Second, assuming platform operators have the resources to push forward new contents on a 
frequent base. This would usually suggest that users probably have to spending more to fully 
experience all contents due to the fact that online platforms’ business models nowadays are 
usually built on microtransaction. This can lead to dissatisfaction among users and may 
backfire. Third, even if most of the new contents are free of charge, the fasting growing 
contents on the platform will very likely lead to an increase in the complexity, which is not 
very friendly to new users or users with less experience. Therefore, an alternative way may 
be needed to incentivize users. The answer to this question for many practitioners, based on 
the trend among online platforms over the past few years, seems to use virtual currency. 
However, the underlying reasoning for many applications may be just vaguely based on 
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traditional economic sense that virtual currency would make the market of exchange more 
liquid. Our results show that without fully understanding the effect of virtual currency, the 
implementation can lead to unsatisfactory result. 
  The results of this study suggest that virtual currency can be used to incentivize users’ 
certain behaviors. It can be used as an effective way to keep users on the platform and 
increase their visit frequencies. It will induce users to exert more efforts in attaining personal 
goals and partially facilitate their payment routines. All of these merits brought by virtual 
currency are very help for online platforms to build up user bases and to keep users engaged 
in achieving goals on the platform. This in turn enables platforms to promote their reputation 
and attract investments. Yet, it shall also be noted that virtual currency should be used with 
caution. Our findings show that, like money, virtual currency also leads to lowered 
interaction among platform users. The preference of personal control and autonomy with less 
reliance and involvement from others can be detrimental to online platforms whose successes 
rely heavily on user interaction. Indeed, virtual currency can motivate users to stay on the 
platform and to exert more efforts to achieve personal target. Yet, they will tend to achieve 
that by their own with less and less involvement of others. In the end, the interactive 
experience will be minimum. For online platforms that heavily depend on user interaction as 
the core of their business model, a growing users base with low user interaction essentially 
creates an illusionary prosperity. If platforms are filled with users who ‘play alone and work 
alone’, either the platforms will have to change their business models to reduce dependency 
on user interaction, or they will lose competitiveness in the market.  
Online platforms want to keep users on the platforms. Virtual currency’s incentivizing 
power can deliver that. But online platforms do not want users to shy away from interaction. 
Unfortunately, that is something virtual currency can also deliver. As money is formidable in 
human society, virtual currency is a powerful but double-edged sword in the hands of Internet 
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business practitioners. We recommend carefulness in its usage. Platforms shall evaluate their 
business model thoroughly before adopting virtual currency. We suggest practitioners to 
carefully device their virtual currency or to take necessarily measures to minimize or 
compensate the potential side effect of virtual currency on user interaction. 
4.6.3 Limitations 
Although our paper offers important contribution to the existing literature, it also has 
certain limitations. In this study, we identify the causal relationship between virtual currency 
and users’ behaviors by controlling the baseline time trend, user and platform level variables 
and unobserved heterogeneity on longitudinal dataset. An additional robust check is adopted 
to ensure the validity of the results. Since this research is conducted in a retrospective way in 
the sense that virtual currency was already launched on the platform at the point of data 
collection, there was no opportunity for us to design a randomized experiment. To improve 
generalization, future studies can conduct randomized experiment and compare the results 
with this study. Moreover, future study can conduct studies for longer periods and compare 
the results with researches on money. In this way, long-term effect pattern of virtual currency 
can be investigated, potentially offering more insights in related topics. We hope that this 
work will encourage more research efforts on virtual currency and its effect on people’s 
behaviors.  
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